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SECTION 365 IN THE CONSUMER
CONTEXT: SOMETHING OLD,
SOMETHING NEW, SOMETHING
BORROWED, SOMETHING BLUE
INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER·
MICHAEL G. HILLINGER··
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, Michael Andrew cheerfully observed that executory
contract law· had become "a hopelessly convoluted and contradictory
jurisprudence."1 He was referring to the case law confusion regarding the
consequences of rejection ofan executory contract. Does rejection mean
contract annihilation (evaporation, defenestration, rescission) or simply
breach? Today, thanks to Andrew, most courts agree that rejection means
breach.2 The debate has moved to the next frontier, namely, what does
"breach" mean? Does it signify termination ofthe contract or simply the
nondebtor party's right to damages.3 In the consumer context, the
distinction has allowed courts to conclude that a debtor can assume a
residential lease that has terminated prepetition so long as it has not
expired.
In short, the situation in 2000 differs little from that in 1991.
Section 365 continues to generate more than its fair share of confusion
and contradictory case law. The following materials discuss several
pockets oflitigation in the consumer context. Some issues are sui generis
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.
** Associate Dean and Professor, Southern New England School ofLaw.
I. Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62
U. COLO. L. REv. I, I (1991).
2. Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group,
Inc.), 138 B.R. 687 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).
3. Eastover Bank v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 874 (1994).
378 COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 104
to consumers, and therefore "new" to the § 365 landscape, e.g., assump-
tion of a terminated residential lease and characterization of rent-to-owrt
contracts. Some are old, e.g., the chronic "is-this-a-true-Iease-or-one-for-
security" bugaboo? Some are "borrowed"-the issues ofprompt cure and
the nondebtor's rights in the event ofpostassumption breach.
Where does "blue" fit in here? There are several possibilities. It
could refer to us as we struggled with the § 365 case law. It could
describe the section itselfbecause Congress just can't seem to get it right
(probably because it is impossible to codify rules to deal with ALL
executory contracts and unexpired leases). It also seems to capture the
mood ofbankruptcy attorneys when they get a § 365 issue because they
know the case law is "hopelessly convoluted and contradictory" and the
likely outcome will be result-driven.
The § 365 consumer debtor case law has a further complication.
Much of it arises in the context of the last great bankruptcy frontier,
Chapter 13. Until recently, Chapter 11 has occupied the minds and hearts
ofcourts and attorneys. Not any more. And, as attorneys and courts take
a closer, harder look at Chapter 13, it is no longer possible to describe it
as a "streamlined creditors-ean't-vote Chapter 11." Chapter 13 is unique,
presenting its very own quandaries, not the least of which is how its
provisions and § 365 interact. We live in interesting times.
II. WHO CAN ASSUME OR REJECT AN EXECUTORY
CONTRACT OR UNEXPIRED LEASE?
A. INTRODUCTION
According to § 365(a), ''the trustee, subject to the court's approval,
may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor. '>4 This means the Chapter 7 trustee has the power to assume or
reject in Chapter 7 proceedings. It suggests the Chapter 13 trustee has
that power in Chapter 13 cases.
In Chapter 7, the "who" question has a crystal clear answer. The
trustee and only the trustee has the power.5 Ironically, this crystal clear
answer creates problems when the Chapter 7 debtor wants to retain the
4. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1998) (emphasis added).
5. See, e.g., Carrico v. Tompkins (In re Tompkins), 95 B.R. 722, 724 (9th CiT. RAP. 1989)
(decision to assume or reject a lease in a Chapter 7 setting is solely the trustee's for a 60-day period
only).
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benefits and rights ofa rejected lease or contract. In Chapter 13, courts
have had to struggle to reach the common sense conclusion that the
debtor, not the trustee, has the power to assume or reject under § 365.
B. THE POSTREJECTION PROBLEM IN CHAPTER 7: IN RE KNIGHT
As noted, the Chapter 7 trustee alone enjoys the power to assume or
reject executory contracts and unexpired leases in Chapter 7 cases.6 What
if the trustee rejects the unexpired lease or executory contract because it
has no value to the estate, but the debtor wants to retain its benefits and
rights? In re Knight7 describes the dilemma posed to the trustee,the
debtor and the nondebtor.
Knight involved the lease ofa 1996 Oldsmobile. When the debtor
filed bankruptcy, she had possession ofthe car, was current on her lease
payments and wanted to retain it. GMAC filed a motion to compel the
trustee to assume or reject the lease. The trustee filed an objection, which
the United States trustee "seconded."
The court began by noting that a Chapter 7 debtor "has no authority
to exercise the option ofassuming or rejecting leases.,,8 GMAC argued
that the trustee's failure to assume the lease would result in its "deemed
rejection" pursuant to § 365(d)(l). That would constitute a breach ofthe
lease according to § 365(g). That breach, in tum, might result in
termination of the lease by operation of law. For sure, the "deemed-
rejection-a.k.a.-breach" would give GMAC the right to terminate the lease
because the lease agreement defined "default" to include "any other act
that is a default under a Lease contract under applicable law.'>9 Thus,
, even if the debtor-lessee wanted to keep the car, GMAC could obtain
relieffrom the stay, declare the lease terminated and recover the car. But,
argued GMAC, if the trustee assumed the lease, the trustee could assign
his 'interest to the debtor under § 365(£)(2). If the trustee were willing to
do that, GMAC would agree not to raise any issues ofadequate assurance
of future performance, under either § 365(b)(1)(C) as to the trustee or
6. Affordable Efficiencies, Inc. v. Bane (In re Bane), 228 B.R. 835, 841 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1998) (section 365(d)(4) provides right to trustee and no other party to assume or reject; therefore,
lessor's actions cannot waive trustee's right, lease is deemed rejected because trustee did not act within
60 days after the filing and debtor does not have right to assume it following conversion to Chapter 13),
affd mem., 182 F.3d 906 (4th Cir. 1999) (table).
7.211 B.R. 747 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997).
8.Id. at 748.
9.Id.
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under § 365(f)(2)(B) against the debtor/assignee. Then both the debtor
and GMAC would have the right to enforce the lease pursuant to its
original tenns. 10
GMAC infonned the court that it was filing motions to compel the
trustee to assume or reject in all Chapter 7 cases in Oregon. It eschewed
trustee abandonment because abandonment would not result in
assumption and only assumption would give GMAC all its pre-
bankruptcy rights.
The trustee objected to GMAC's motion, arguing that the power to
assume is discretionary and should not be exercised unless the decision
would benefit the estate. He maintained that
it is unfair to the debtors for him to make a decision to either
assume or reject a lease which will directly impact only the debtor.
Ifthe trustee were to reject the lease, GMAC would have the option
as to whether it wanted to do business with the debtor. The debtor
would have no option. Further, the trustee will often not know that
there is an outstanding lease until the § 341 hearing ... [and] may
not have time . . . to file a motion to assume or reject.
Additionally, ifthe court were to require the trustee to file motions
under § 365 on all outstanding vehicle leases, it could be setting a
precedent which would obligate the trustee to thoroughly review all
the debtor's ongoing contract payments and file § 365 motions to
assume or reject on every one, including, but not limited to, utility
services, furniture and appliance leases and medical equipment
leases. GMAC's proposed process would place a significant
burden on the trustee and on the court. In asset cases, the cost of
filing such pleadings may be at the expense of the estate's
creditors. II
According to the court, GMAC was really asking the court to order
the trustee to assume the lease. A motion to compel was not necessary to
effect a rejection because it would occur with the simple passage oftime.
The court understood GMAC's predicament ifthe trustee did not assume.
Ifthe debtor were current on her lease payments at the commencement of
the case, GMAC could not obtain relieffrom the stay to obtain possession
ofthe vehicle because the debtor would not be in default. If, at any later
time, the debtor stopped making payments, the discharge would preclude
10. !d.
11. Id.
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GMAC from collecting the balance owed. GMAC would only be entitled
to repossess the depreciated vehicle. In addition, "[if], postbankruptcy,
the debtor missed a lease payment but wished to cure the default and
continue the lease payments, because of the discharge of her personal
liability for the payments, the lessor cannot tell the debtor that if she
wants to cure the default and keep the vehicle she has an obligation to
make timely future payments."12 Assumption would solve GMAC's
dilemma because it would permit postbankruptcy enforcement ofthe lease
according to its terms.
The court refused to order the trustee to assume the lease for several
reasons. First, the court's role is to review, not dictate, a trustee's
decisions under § 365. Second, assumption is only warranted ifit is in the
estate's best interest, and GMAC had failed to show how assumption
would benefit the estate at all. In fact, the court believed that assumption
would harm the estate if the trustee assumed, but did not assign the lease.
In that event, the trustee would have to cure defaults, compensate the
lessor for actual losses and make all future payments. The absence of
default in this case did not mean its absence in others, given GMAC's
decision to file these motions in all Chapter 7 cases in Oregon.
The court went on to make two significant observations. First,
GMAC had never answered the court's question as to how it had handled
such situations before it began making these motions.. Second, it had
"coincidentally" initiated its practice offiling these motions "immediately
after Sears was severely sanctioned nationwide ... for systematically
obtaining reaffirmation agreements with debtors which were never filed
with or approved by the bankruptcy court.,,13
The last portion of the opinion was cautionary. Essentially, the
court said the following. Even though rejection constitutes a breach,
courts disagree on whether breach effects a termination. If rejection does
not terminate the lease, and postrejection, the lessor and debtor-lessee "re-
negotiate" an agreement that looks like their prepetition lease, that will
presumptively represent a reaffirmation of the parties' prepetition lease.
And if so, the lessor needs to follow the rules regarding reaffirmations
unless it wants to finds itself in violation of § 524(a)'s permanent
injunction. In any such litigation, the court warned, ''the creditor will
12. [d. at 749.
13. [d. at 750
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have the burden of proving that the agreement represents a new,
postpetition obligation. "14
Knight makes several important points:
I) Only the trustee has the power to assume in a
Chapter 7 case and a court will only approve the decision to
assume if it will benefit the estate.
2) A Chapter 7 debtor's interest in retaining leased
property or contract rights will rarely benefit the estate.
3) In most cases when the debtor wants to retain the
benefits of an executory contract or unexpired lease, the
contract will be deemed rejected 60 days after the petition date
because the trustee will not bother to act15
4) Rejection represents breach, but breach does not
necessarily mean the contract is terminated. Ifit still breathes,
its negotiated continuation constitutes a reaffirmation
agreement and the nondebtor party had better comply with §
524(c).16
Although not mentioned in Knight, one assumes that attempts to
change the contract terms to make the renegotiated lease or contract look
like a "new, postpetition" agreement are fraught with peril. Courts were
not born yesterday. Moreover, the Sears debacle has made them ever
more aware and vigilant. 17
14.Id.
15. See II U.S.C. § 365(d)(l) (1998).
16.But see In re Petersen, lID B.R. 946, 950 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)(whereinfonnedChapter
7 debtor-lessee elects, postpetition, to adopt and continue prepetition commercial lease agreement
rejected by the trustee, and legally sufficient postpetition consideration exists between the parties, the
lease will be deemed binding, enforceable postpetition obligation of the debtor rather than invalid
reaffirmation agreement).
17. Thomas J. Yerbich, Esq., notes the courts' ad hoc approach to the postrejection situation and
Congress' attempt to correct the problem. ConsumerLeases -A ProposedAlternative, CRACKING 1HE
CODE: A NEWSLETTER OF INSOLVENCY PROFESSIONALS, 30 Mar. 1999.
[http://www.abiworld.orgiabidata/online/newsletJ99maryerbich.html]. He argues the proposed
legislation is inadequate. Among other things, it should: expressly establish that the § 524(c)
reaffirmation and § 365(b) cure requirements apply to rejected leases; spell out the consequences ofthe
debtor's failure to "assume," e.g.;the lease is deemed terminated and the debtor must immediately
surrender the property; establish a deadline for "assumption;" require the debtor to give early
notification ofhis/her intentions; prohibit a debtor's continued use without compensatingthe lessor; and
preclude the lessor from extracting additional concessions or terms that improve upon its prepetition
"bargain." Mr. Yerbich's recommendations blur the assumption process with that ofreaffrrmation.
(continued...)
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The postrejection problem exists with residential leases as well. As
one court noted, "it would be an aberrant circumstance where a Chapter
7 trustee would assume (with the concomitant requirement of cure) a
residential apartment lease . . . ."18 Residential real estate lessors need to
be on guard lest they, too, run afoul of the Code's reaffirmation
provisions. 19
The authors recently heard that a Massachusetts Chapter 7 debtor
filed a motion to assume a car lease. Although finding the motion odd, the
judge ultimately granted it because no one objected. The story
underscores why the rules governing reaffirmation, not assumption,
should control such situations. A motion to assume requires notice to the
nondebtor party and such other parties in interest as the court may
direct.20 It is a contested matte~l and as such, no response is required.22
The party against whom relief is sought-the nondebtor party, in our
situation, the lessor-is hardly going to go into court and hop up and
down to protest the Chapter 7 debtor's request to assume the lease. It will
please the nondebtor lessor no end to receive notice ofthe debtor's motion.
What about other creditors ofthe debtor? Will they object? One assumes
they will be supremely indifferent. Why should they care what the debtor
does with his or her postpetition income? They have no stake or interest
in the decision. A Chapter 7 debtor's motion to assume subjects the
proposed action to the "scrutiny" of one party who is ecstatic over the
news and others-the general creditor body-who couldn't care less. In
a word, no one is going to object. A motion to assume channels
evaluation of the motion to a listless audience focused solely on its own
problems and sorrows.
The process governing reaffirmation subjects the debtor's decision
to two potential levels of "review," both of which are designed to
scrutinize the wisdom ofthe decision in terms of its effects on the debtor
and the debtor's dependents. Section 524(c) states the rules regarding
17. (...continued)
They are different substantively as well as procedurally.
18. In re Sheard, 1999 WL 454260 ·2, n.S (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 24, 1999) (No.
98-19627DWS).
19.11 U.S.C. §S24(cX6XB)(1998) presentlyexempts consumerdebtssecuredbyreal property
from its requirements. One wonders ifthe exemption should extend to residential real property leases
as well?
20. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6006(c).
21. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6006(a).
22. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
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reaffinnation. The proposed agreement must be submitted to the court. 23
Ifthe debtor is not represented by an attorney, the court must approve the
agreement as in the debtor's best interest and not imposing an undue
hardship on the debtor or the debtor's dependents. 24 If the debtor was
represented by an attorney during the course ofnegotiating the agreement,
the attorney is supposed to serve a similar oversight function. 25 If the
attorney believes the agreement will impose an undue hardship, he or she
should not sign the required affidavit. The court must then approve (or
disapprove) the agreement pursuant to § 524(c)(6)(A).
The same tenns and the same postpetition obligations may result,
whether the Chapter 7 debtor assumes or reaffinns. The difference lies
in the degree ofscrutiny involved, the nature ofthe scrutiny and who will
do the scrutinizing. A Chapter 7 debtor's decision to retain the benefits
of a prepetition contract or lease affects the debtor and the debtor's
dependents, not the debtor's creditors. The debtor's attorney and the
court are the parties properly, legitimately and genuinely concerned with
the debtor's decision. The rules regarding reaffinnation address the real
issues. Reaffinnation pursuant to § 524(c), not assumption under § 365,
is the appropriate process to evaluate a Chapter 7 debtor's decision to
retain the benefits of a prepetition contract.
The Chapter 7 debtor who wishes to retain possession of a car
subject to a security interest has an additional option. The debtor can
redeem it for the amount of the allowed secured claim.26 In some
jurisdictions, the debtor may choose a "fourth option": to retain the car so
long as she continues to make payments under the original agreement. 27
For a debtor wishing to retain a leased car, assumption ofthe lease is not
an available remedy because the debtor does not have the power to assume
in a Chapter 7. Moreover, a Chapter 7 lessee cannot redeem leased
goods. Therefore, the lessee in Chapter can only retain leased goods
through the reaffinnation process.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 524(cX3) (1998).
24.Id. § 524(cX6XA).
25. For instance, the attorney is required to submit an affidavit or declaration stating that the
debtor's decision to reaffmn was voluntary and a product of informed consent, id. § 524(cX3)(A), and
does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent. Id. § 524(c)(3XB).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1998).
27. See Capital Communications Fed Credo Union v. Boodrow (In re Boodrow), 126 F.3d 43
(2d Cir. 1997); contra Bank of Boston v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting
fourth option).
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C. CHAPTER 13
In Chapter 13, unlike Chapter 11, the Chapter 13 trustee and the
debtor are always two different persons. Section 1302 details the trustee's
duties. Section 1303 describes the debtor's rights and powers. Chapter
13 is limited to individual debtors.28 The debtor, not the Chapter 13
trustee, proposes the plan. A Chapter 13 plan can assume or reject
contracts and leases not previously rejected.29 If only the debtor can
propose a Chapter 13 plan, and the plan can assume or reject contracts
not previously rejected, one would think the debtor would have the right
to assume and reject under § 365, but § 365 says nothing about Chapter
13 debtors.
Section 365's failure to mention the Chapter 13 debtor is
anomalous.3D Section 365(a) authorizes the trustee to assume or reject.
In addition, § 365(d)(2) does not identify the Chapter 13 debtor as an
appropriate object ofa motion to compel.3! Indeed, it implies otherwise
because it provides that "the court, on request of any party to such
contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine within a specified
period oftime whether to assume or reject such contract or lease."32 One
court surmised that this probably represented a drafting oversight because
"[i]n practice, it makes little sense to compel the Chapter 13 trustee,
rather than the debtor, to assume or reject an unexpired lease or executory
contract particularly where the debtor-and not the Chapter 13
trustee-exercises the option in connection with the plan."33
The courts have taken different paths to reach the "common sense"
result. Many courts assume, without analysis, that the Chapter 13 debtor
has the power to assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired
leases.34 Others seem to find the authority from § 1322(b)(7) which
permits a Chapter 13 plan to "provide for the assumption, rejection, or
assignment ofany executory contract or unexpired lease ofthe debtor not
28. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)(1998).
29. Id. § 1322(b)(7).
30. In re Yasin, 179 B.R. 43, 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 48.
34. See, e.g., In re DiCamillo, 206 B.R. 64, 66 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1997) (Ua Chapter 13 debtor
may assume or reject an 'unexpired lease ofthe debtor"').
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previously rejected under such section ...."35 Yet others seem to equate
the Chapter 13 debtor with the Chapter 11 debtor in possession.36 One
court cryptically relied on the limited role of the trustee in Chapter 13
cases and § 103(a) "which states that all provisions found in Chapters 1,
3, and 5 are applicable to cases filed under Chapter 7,9, 11, 12, or 13."37
The Code's apparent distinction between a trustee and a Chapter 13
debtor led to an interesting result in In re Dodd.38 The Chapter 13 debtors
in Dodd operated a franchise restaurant. They filed on December 2,
1986. More than 60 days later, on February 10, 1987, the landlord filed
a motion to compel them to surrender the nonresidential premises. The
debtors countered with a request to extend the time to assume or reject
their lease. The issue was whether § 365(d)(4) applied in a Chapter 13
case. If it did not, the debtors were not bound by its restrictive deadlines
and presumably could wait until confirmation to decide.39
Needless to say, the nondebtorlessor maintained that § 365(d)(4) did
apply in Chapter 13 cases. The debtors and Chapter 13 trustee argued it
did not "because a Chapter 13 trustee is not empowered to operate a
debtor's business and, therefore, cannot make a decision regarding
assumption or rejection of a lease.,>40 The court agreed with the debtor
and trustee. Section 1302 does not authorize the Chapter 13 trustee to
operate the business. Rather, § 1304(b) authorizes the Chapter 13 debtor
to do so.
35. See, e.g., In re Sheard, 1999 WL 454260 *1, n.3 (Bankr. E.O. Pa. June 24, 1999) (No.
98-196270WS) ("Section 1322(bX7) gives the debtor who is the one to propose the Chapter 13 plan
the ability to assume or reject notwithstanding the language of § 365 which speaks ofassumption and
rejection by the trustee. Thus while the Code would appear to also give the Chapter 13 trustee the right
to assume or reject, this matter is commonly left to the debtor who has the interest and information to
make such decision." (quoting 5 NORlONBANKRUPTCyLAw & PRACTICE 2D § 121:10 at 121-107»;
Riddle v. Aneira (In re Aneiro), 72 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. S.O. Cal. 1987).
36. See, e.g., In re Scott, 209 B.R. 777,781 n.5 (Bankr. S.O. Ga. 1997) (noting, in a Chapter
13 case, that "although [§ 365] uses the word 'trustee,' the right to assume or reject ... can also be
exercised by a debtor-in-possession in a reorganization case."); In re Brewer, 233 B.R. 825, 828
(Bankr. E.O. Ark. 1999)(citingScott).
37. In re Hall, 202 B.R. 929, 932 n.2 (Bankr. W.O. Tenn. 1996).
38.73 B.R. 67 (Bankr. E.O. Cal. 1987).
39. If § 365(dX4) does not apply in Chapter 13 cases, that means no time limits of any kind
exist on the decision to assume orreject nonresidential real property leases in Chapter 13 cases. Section
365(dXl) is limited to Chapter 7 cases. Section 365(dX2) covers cases under Chapters 9, 11, 12 and
13, but is limitedto unexpired leases ofresidential real property. The court never discussed the broader
implications of its holding.
40. Dodd, 73 B.R. at 68.
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11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(4) is inconsistent with § 1304. Ifit is the
debtor who is to operate the business, how can the trustee make a
decision on whether a lease of nonresidential real property should
be assumed or rejected? It would not be practical to burden a
trustee with having to make this decision when the trustee will
never operate a business.41
Moreover, specific provisions in the operating chapters govern over
general provisions in the service chapters. Because the Chapter 13 debtor
is the person who operates the business, it is the Chapter 13 debtor who
should decide, "by way ofconfirmed plan,'>42 whether to assume or reject.
Therefore, according to the court, § 365(d)(4) did not apply in Chapter 13
cases. The court believed that the relative speed of Chapter 13
proceedings protected nondebtor lessors from long periods ofuncertainty
and therefore satisfied the policy predicate underlying § 365(d)(4)'s
enactment.
The court never discussed whether ''trustee'' in § 365(a) means the
same thing 'as "trustee" in § 365(d)(4). Dewsnup43 notwithstanding, a
term used in one subsection usually has the same meaning when it is used
in another subsection of the same provision. If so, the court was
effectively holding that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot assume or reject under
§ 365(a) even though he or she could exercise that same power via a plan.
Presumably other courts would be disinclined to extend Dodd's holding
to § 365(a). That would simultaneously preclude the Chapter 13 debtor
from rejecting under § 365(a) and potentially subject the estate (and
debtor) to greater administrative expenses.
Bankruptcy Rule 6006 inferentially supports the argument that
"debtor" in § 365 includes Chapter 13 debtors. It provides:
Aproceedingby aparty to an executory contract or unexpired lease
in a [C]hapter 9 municipality case, [C]hapter 11 reorganization
case, [C]hapter 12 family farmer's debt adjustment case, or
[C]hapter 13 individual's debt adjustment case, to require the
41. Id. at 68-9.
42.Id. at 69
43. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) ("allowed secured claim" in § 506(d) has
different meaning from same term in § 506(a) because Court was not convinced Congress intended to
depart from pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected).
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trustee, debtor-in-possession, or debtor to determine whether to
assume or reject the contract or lease is governed by Rule 9014.44
As one court noted, "debtor" is superfluous in a Chapter 9 case because
''trustee'' means "debtor."45 Moreover, "debtor" in Bankruptcy Rule 6006
does not refer to the Chapter 11 debtor in or out ofpossession. "The only
... situations in which the reference to 'debtor' would not include the
'trustee' are Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases. Of course, the rules do
not supplant the statute in the event of conflict, but presumably the rule
and § 1322(b)(7) and common sense are enough to overcome § 365's
'plain meaning. ",
Although courts have adopted different ways ofgetting there, most
have reached the same conclusion. The Chapter 13 debtor is the party
entitled to assume or reject, be it by separate motion under § 365, or in the
plan. The Honorable Keith Lundin concurs:
It makes little sense for anyone other than the debtor to move for
assumption or rejection . . . . It makes even less sense to interpret
the Code to preclude a [C]hapter 13 debtor from assuming,
assigning, or rejecting an unexpired lease or executory contract
before confirmation of a plan. The Code could be interpreted to
allow the [C]hapter 13 trustee to manage executory contracts and
unexpired leases before confirmation to the exclusion ofthe debtor
and then permit the debtor to use § 365 only as part of a plan;
however, there is no obvious logic to this division ofresponsibility.
The [C]hapter 13 trustee has no statutory responsibility to police
the management of unexpired leases and executory contracts in
advance of confirmation. The [C]hapter 13 debtor on the other
hand may have great incentives to get out ofunfavorable leases or
executory contracts or to assume favorable ones. It makes little
sense to require the debtor to convince the [C]hapter 13 trustee to
invoke § 365 on the debtor's behalf when the debtor is the party
best situated to commence and prosecute such actions. Chapter 13
debtors should be allowed to get out of an apartment lease, reject
a car lease, cancel a contract for the lease of furniture or home
appliances, or assume such contracts by filing a motion for
assumption or rejection at any time after the petition. Congress
could have made this power more clearly available to [C]hapter 13
44. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6006.
45. In re Yasin, 179 B.R. 43, 48-49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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debtors; § 1322(b)(7) should be interpreted to permit [C]hapter 13
debtors § 365 relief in advance of confirmation of a plan.46
III. HOW TO ASSUME IN CHAPTER 13
Bankruptcy Rule 6006(a) states: "A proceeding to assume, reject,
or assign an executory contract or unexpired lease, other than as part of
a plan, is governed by Rule 9014.'047 Because Rule 9014 requires a
motion, reasonable notice and the opportunity for a hearing, Rule 6006(a)
clearly establishes the ground rules for assumption or rejection outside of
a plan. It leaves something to be desired in terms of what is required
when assumption or rejection is proposed as part of the plan. Does it
require notice and an opportunity for a hearing and if so, what will
suffice?
Several courts have discussed the issue.48 They have not reached the
same conclusions. Prudence dictates giving the nondebtor party specific
notice of the intent to assume when the debtor proposes to assume the
contract or lease in the plan.
Although one case, In re Flugel,49 involved an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real estate, and hence triggered § 365(d)(4)'s "deemed-
rejected-if-not-assumed-within-60-days-of-the filing" mandate, the court's
reasoning may extend beyond the business context to consumer debtors
seeking to assume residential leases and leases of consumer goods.
Certainly, it won't hurt consumer debtors to comply with its teachings.
The debtors in Flugel, doing business as Spicey Fish Tales, filed a
plan along with their Chapter 13 petition on November 29, 1995. They
attached an additional page entitled"17. Special Provision. Real Estate
Lease Assumption."50 This page described their proposed treatment of
two leases during the pendency period and beyond, including payment of
arrearages. On December 1, 1995, the complaining lessor, DWA,
received a notice of the stay and the first page of the petition. On
December 8, it received notice of the § 341 meeting. That notice
46. KEI11i M. LuNDIN, CHAPTER 13 § 3.47 at 3-24 (2d ed. 1994).
47. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6006 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., In re REPH Acquisition Co., 134 B.R. 194 (N.D. Tex. 1991); In re Hall, 202
B.R. 929 (Bankr. W.O. Tenn. 1996); In re Flugel, 197 B.R. 92 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996); Riddle v.
Aneiro (In re Aneiro), 72 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
49. 197 B.R. 92 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996).
50. Id. at 94.
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summarized the plan generally and stated that the plan itself was on file
with the bankruptcy court. It also provided:
"Special Notice to DWA SMITH CO" regarding "BACK
RENTILEASE" as follows: Creditors named above who have
allowed claims for real estate or mobile home arrears shall be paid
100% in non-cumulative installments as indicated. Monthly
payments shall be in advance of other creditors .... Post-petition
regular monthly payments shall be paid to lienholders by the debtor
directly. 51
Along with other objections to confirmation, OWAargued that the debtors
could not assume the lease because they had never filed a motion to
assume, more than 60 days had passed since the filing of their petition,
and therefore, the lease was deemed rejected pursuant to § 365. The court
framed the issue as whether "a motion to assume [is] necessary when
assumption is proposed in a plan."52
The court concluded that a formal motion under Bankruptcy Rule
9014 was not necessary, but a debtor must give notice to the nondebtor
party to satisfy the policy objective underlying § 365(d)(4) ''to prevent
parties in contractual or lease relationships with the debtor from being left
in doubt concerning their status vis-a.-vis the estate.,,53 The court adopted
the holding of REPH Acquisition54 that even if Bankruptcy Rule 6006
excuses a motion, assumption pursuant to a plan requires notice and an
opportunity for a hearing.55 The court was satisfied that OWA had
received sufficient notice. The debtors had expressed their intention to
assume in their plan. They had filed the plan with their petition. Shortly
thereafter, OWA received notice ofthe § 341 meeting with specific notice
of the debtors' intention to assume OWA's lease.
DWA had an opportunity to object, which it did on January II, and
March 8, 1996, and an opportunity to be heard. DWA was
afforded the safeguards which would have been afforded under
[Bankruptcy] Rules 6006(a) and 9014. This Court holds that the
51. Id.
52.Id.
53. Id. at 95.
54. In re REPH Acquisition Co., 134 B.R. 194 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
55.Id.
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assumption provision in the plan, together with the § 341 Notice,
satisfied the requirements of § 365(d)(4).56
The court added a cautionary note, warning debtors not to rely solely
on the § 341 notice which is prepared and sent by the Chapter 13 trustee.
In this case the 341 Notice made specific mention of the Debtor's
intent to assume the particular lease with OWA. The result may
not have been the same had the 341 notice failed to mention OWA
specifically. A debtor may wish to send specific notice to
landlords. Similarly the result may not have been the same had the
plan simply carried a blanket boilerplate assumption provision as
inREPH,57
Another opinion, also involving a nonresidential real estate lease,
took a different tack. In Riddle v. Aneiro (In re Aneiro),58 the court began
by noting that § 365(a) requires court approval for assumption or
rejection. Bankruptcy Rules 9013 and 9014 require requests for court
orders to be made by motion. "A motion is 'made' when served on the
opposing party."59 The court clerk served a § 341 notice on all creditors.
Under "Summary of Proposed Plan," the notice stated:
Debtor's Chapter 13 proposed plan for treatment ofdebts is on file
at court and is a public record. Creditors must refer to the plan for
precise details. . .. [U)nable to adequately summarize debtor's
proposed plan. Each creditor is advised to contact the attorney for
debtor and request a true copy of debtor's proposed plan to
determine how the plan might affect each creditor.60
According to the court, the debtor made a motion to assume when the
clerk sent the § 341 notice and notice of the plan. ''The liberal policies
underlying Chapter 13 relief do not require a separate, formal motion to
assume a lease when the debtor communicates an intent to assume
56. Id. at 95-6.
57.Id. at 96 n.6; see also In re Hall, 202 B.R. 929,933 (Bankr. W.O. Tenn. 1996) (Chapter
13 debtor satisfied requirements when she provided for assumption of lease in her plan, sent notice of
assumption to lessor by attaching copy of plan to § 341 notice, no one objected to conf1lltllltion, and
court confumed her plan).
58.72 B.R. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
59. Id. at 427.
60.Id.
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pursuant to § 1322(b)(7) under the tenns of a plan filed within the
§ 365(d)(4) time period.'>61
Notwithstanding Aneiro, it is better to be safe than sorry. Debtors
should send the nondebtor party a personalized notice of their intent to
assume under the plan and describe the tenns ofthe proposed assumption.
IV. EFFECT OF FAaURE TO ASSUME OR REJECT
A. IN CHAPTER 7
Section 365 attempts to provide closure in Chapter 7 for all
executory contracts and all unexpired leases, whether they involve
residential or nonresidential real estate, commercial or consumer personal
property leases. Section 365(d)(l) provides that an executory contract or
unexpired lease of residential real property or personal property "is
deemed rejected in a [C]hapter 7 case if the trustee fails to assume or
reject it within 60 days after the order for relief, or within such additional
time as the court, for cause, within such 60-day period, fixes . . . .'>62
Section 365(d)(4) states a similar rule for nonresidential real property
leases in which the debtor is the lessee, but its message applies to all the
relief chapters and it adds "and the trustee shall immediately surrender
such nonresidential real property to the lessor.'>63
The rules are clear, both in tenns oftheir governing time limits and
who must act. 64 They are also conclusive. Chapter 7 trustees are not
61. Id.
62. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(I)(1998)(emphasis added).
63. The one missing piece is nonresidential real property leases in which the lessor is the debtor.
64. The consequences of§ 365(d)(4) are not so clear. In fact, § 365(4) inspired the judge-made
distinction between "breach" and "termination." See. e.g., Eastover Bank v. Sowashee Venture (In re
Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 874 (1994). Therejection-as-breach
"doctrine" arose in response to holdings that § 365(d)(4) terminates a debtor-commercial lessee's lease
agreement, its leasehold interest andany and all thirdparty rights and interests associated with them.
See, e.g., In re Gillis, 92 B.R. 461, 465-66 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1988) (effect of rejection is to terminate
lease absolutely and state law cannot affect or impair it: so, too, bank's security interest in debtor-
lessee's leasehold estate is completely extinguished because no leasehold interest remains to which
security interest could attach).
Although never articulated, the rejection-as-breach courts seem concerned with protecting the
rights ofthird parties with an interest in the debtor's leasehold interest, e.g., financiers and sublessees.
Terminating the debtor's leasehold interest has harsh consequences to them. It also benefits the lessor.
For instance, assume Bank has a valid interest in Debtor-Lessee's leasehold interest (a common
phenomenon in ground leases). In terminator territory (jurisdictions that hold § 365(d)(4) terminates
the lease), Lessee's lease agreement and leasehold interest would terminate by operation oflaw at the
(continued...)
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excused from acting within the requisite time even when they do not know
about a lease or contract.65
B. IN CHAPTER 13
The situation in Chapter 13 is less clear. First, with the exception
of § 365(d)(4)66 neither § 365 nor any Chapter 13 provision deems
64. (...continued)
end ofthe 60 day period and Bank's contract rights under the lease would as well. As a result, Bank's
collateral-Lessee's leasehold estate-would evaporate. Bank's secured claim would become an
unsecured claim. That result obtains in tenninator territory even though Lessee's ground lease grants
Bank a variety ofprotections and rights vis-A-vis Lessor in the event ofLessee default
Viewed cosmically, a lessor stands to benefit (significantly) from the happenstance of a
commercial lessee's bankruptcy and failure to assume within the requisite period oftime described by
§ 36S(dX4). Lessee's fmancier stands to suffer a significant loss. What may have been a fully secured
claim becomes ''fully'' unsecured. Assuming Lessee's estate has no assets, Bank would lose its entire
claim. IfLessee's estate had assets, Bank would lose less, but suffer a loss nevertheless. Moreover,
other creditors ofthe estate would receive less in distribution given the addition of Bank's unsecured
claim. For sure, the estate would suffer a loss in the amount by which the value ofthe leasehold estate
exceeded the indebtedness owed to Bank.
Although non-terminator courts ascribe different effects to §36S(dX4)'s passive rejection, they
uniformly agree it does not terminate the lease or the lessee's leasehold interest. Consequently, a
leasehold mortgagee's collateral would not evaporate. Therefore, after relieffromthe stay, Bankcould
foreclose against the leasehold in~est at state law and recover its claim or portion thereof. Ifthe debtor
had subleased the property, Bank's foreclosure would not cause any disruption to Lessor in payment
or otherwise, nor would it create a vacancy in the premises. Bank would simply sell the leasehold
interest and the right to receive the sublease rentals to a third party. Lessor would be no worse for the
wear. It would receive exactly what it bargained to receive at state law. In addition, creditors of
Lessee's estate would not have to divide their small pie into still smaller pieces to take into account a
new unsecured claim. With luck, the pie might expand ifBank could sell its interest for more than the
indebtedness owed.
As noted, limiting the consequences of § 36S(dX4) automatic rejection to breach protects the
rights ofthird parties with interests in the leasehold. As presently constructed, § 36S does not protect
such third parties. Some courts have taken the situation into their own hands. The leading rejection-is-
breach opinion is Eastover Bank v. Sowashee Venture(lnre Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077 (SthCir.),
cert. denied, S13 U.S. 874 (1994).
The rejection-as-breach doctrine has had a life ofits own. Courts in the consumer context have
used it to breathe life into what would otherwise appear to be moribund leases. See Part IX ofthese
materials infra.
65. Carrico v. Tompkins (In re Tompkins), 9S B.R. 722, 724 (9th Cir. BAP. 1989) (trustee
has affirmative duty to investigate for unscheduled executory contracts and statutory presumption of
rejection of such contracts not assumed within 60 days is conclusive); Hoffinan v. Vecchitto (In re
Vecchitto), 23S B.R. 231, 236 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999) (same); Affordable Efficiencies, Inc. v. Bane
(In re Bane), 228 B.R. 83S, 840 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1998) (same), affd mem., 182 F.3d 906 (4thCir.
1999) (table).
66. At least one court has said § 36S(d)(4) does not apply in a Chapter 13 case because (dX4)
speaks about the trustee and in Chapter 13 cases, it is the debtor who assumes and rejects because only
the debtor can propose a Chapter 13 plan. See In re Flugel, 197 B.R. 92 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) and
(continued...)
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executory contracts and unexpired leases rejected ifaction is not taken by
a certain time. Moreover, assumption requires an affinnative act, either
the debtor's separate motion to assume in advance of a plan or a plan
provision proposing assumption, followed by court approval. In terms of
time, § 365(d)(2) authorizes the ''trustee'' to
assume or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of
residential real property or of personal property ... at any time
before confirmation ofa plan but the court, on the request of any
party to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine
within a specified period of time whether to assume or reject such
contract or lease.67
Thus, with the exception ofnonresidential real estate leases in which the
debtor is the lessee, the Chapter 13 debtor has until plan confirmation to
decide whether to assume or reject unless the court, in response to a
nondebtor party's request, fixes an earlier moment in time. Absent any
action by anyone, it would appear that the contract or lease is neither
assumed nor rejected in a confirmed Chapter 13 case. Presumably, as in
Chapter 11 cases, such contracts and leases "ride through" bankruptcy
unaffected.68 The nondebtor party does not have a claim for bankruptcy
purposes, and therefore does not participate in any way, e.g., receive a
distribution. In addition, the contract is binding on the debtor despite the
bankruptcy discharge.
We could not find any Chapter 13 case on point. (Maybe that is
because most Chapter 13 plans address the issue and expressly provide
for rejection of all executory contracts and leases not assumed?) The
situation is only rarely addressed in the Chapter 11 case law. We discuss
66. (...continued)
discussion in Part III supra.
67. II U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1998).
68. See, e.g., Phoenix Mutual Life Insur. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone
III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1281 (5th Cir.) ("A debtor in Chapter II must either assume or
reject its leases with third parties .... Ifit does neither, the leases continue in effect and the lessees have
no provable claim against the bankruptcy estate), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 821 (1992); In re Taylor, 198
B.R. 142 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996) (unexpired lease or executory contract may be treated in four ways: it
may (I) be rejected, (2) be assumed and retained, (3) be assumed and assigned, or (4) "ride through"
the bankruptcy process); cf National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 546
n.12 (1984) ("in the unlikely event that the contract is neither assumed nor rejected, it will 'ride
through' the bankruptcy proceeding and be binding on the debtor even after a discharge is granted. The
non-debtor party's claim will therefore survive the bankruptcy proceeding.") (Brennan, J., concurring
& dissenting).
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an opinion involving an individual Chapter 11 case on the assumption that
its reasoning would apply if a comparable fact pattern were to arise in a
Chapter 13 context. The lesson to be learned is more for the nondebtor
party than the debtor.
In In re Col,69 the debtors, husband and wife, began' their
bankruptcy journey in Chapter 11. Before filing, they had entered into
agreements to lease four vehicles including two BMWs. The debtors did
not seek to assume or reject their lease agreements during administration
ofthe Chapter II case nor did the leasing company move to compel their
assumption or rejection. The debtors obtained confirmation oftheir plan,
but the case converted to a Chapter 7 when they failed to consummate it.
The lessor sought an administrative claim of$17,140 on the two BMWs,
representing accumulated unpaid monthly lease payments.
The court noted that the lessor's claim was only entitled to
administrative expense status ifthe leases had been assumed or the estate
had'benefitted from the use of the vehicles.70 The court explained that
even though § 1123(b)(2f1 permits a Chapter 11 plan to propose
assumption of an unexpired lease, that right is subject to § 365.
[T]he trustee's power under section 365(a) ... is not absolute
but rather is "subject to court approval." Thus, what the plan
proposes with respect to assumption, assignment or rejection of
executory contracts is not necessarily what the court will detennine
to be pennissible. Section 1123(b)(2) is pennissive. The plan may
provide for the assumption or assignment ofan executory contract.
On the other hand, the contract may "ride through" the plan as
unaffected.72
The court concluded the leases were never assumed because she never
"had the opportunity to pass on the issue of whether assumption would
benefit the estate,73 and never authorized assumption." Because the lessor
did not even allege, let alone prove, that the BMW leases had benefitted
the estate, the court denied its request for an administrative claim.74 .
69. 189 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
70. /d. at 46.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX7) is the Chapter 13 analogue.
72. Cole, 189 B.R. at 46.
73./d.
74. See id. But see In re Frady, 141 B.R. 600, 603 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1991) (debtor must
assume or reject rent-to-own contract and creditor entitled to administrative expense claim for unpaid
(continued...)
396 COMNffiRc~LAWJOURNAL VOL. 104
Presumably, the Chapter 13 nondebtor party to an unassumed,
unrejected executory contract or unexpired lease would suffer a similar
fate, but that result is not inevitable. At the very least, nondebtor parties
should read the debtor's plan and object to its confirmation ifit does not
provide for their contract or lease. The nondebtor party can also move the
court to compel the debtor to decide in advance ofconfirmation. Both the
debtor and the nondebtor party have the power to effect closure here.
Even in a Chapter 7 case, the nondebtor party can find itself out of
luck. In Maupin v. Franklin Equity Leasing Co. (In re Maupin),75 the
Chapter 7 trustee abandoned the debtor's car lease. The debtor,
apparently without objection from the lessor, continued to use the car
from the petition date, February 19th, until he surrendered it to the lessor
on August 20th. The debtor received his discharge on June 23. The
lessor sued the debtor in state court to recover for the debtor's postpetition
use of the vehicle. The debtor brought an adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy court alleging a violation of the discharge order.
The court concluded the lessor had violated the discharge order by
seeking to enforce a discharged debt. It reasoned as follows. Because the
trustee abandoned the vehicle as an asset of the estate, the lease was
deemed rejected pursuant to § 365(d)(l). Rejection constitutes a breach
of the lease, giving rise to a prepetition claim for damages. That claim
includes the loss of rent for the remainder of the lease term. As a
prepetition claim, § 727(b) discharged it. Consequently, the lessor's
attempt to collect for the debtor's postpetition use ofthe vehicle violated
§ 524(a)(2)'s permanent injunction. Maupin has a clear moral for
nondebtor lessors: Do not allow a Chapter 7 debtor to retain possession
and use of your property absent a valid reaffirmation agreement.
Another analysis is possible and we think preferable, namely, a
debtor's postpetition, postrejection use gives rise to a postpetition claim
in favor of the lessor against the debtor, not the estate. As such, the
lessor's claim is not affected by the debtor's bankruptcy discharge.
One thing is clear. The position and rights oflessor and debtor post-
rejection/abandonment in a Chapter 7 are nebulous at best.
74. (...continued)
postpetition rental payments).
75. 165 B.R. 864 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994).
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v. EFFECT OF CONVERSION ON RIGHT TO ASSUME &
TIME PERIODS
Section 348 defines the effects of conversion. According to its
general rule, even though conversion constitutes an order for reliefunder
the chapter to which the case is converted, that does not alter the date the
petition was filed, the date the case was commenced or the date of the
(original) order for relie£.?6 Section 348(c) states an exception to that
rule. For purposes of§ 365(d), the conversion order constitutes the order
for relief, i.e., the date of the conversion order is the date ofthe order for
relief for purposes ofthe § 365(d) deadlines. The legislative history tells
us that ''the time the trustee (or debtor in possession) has for assuming or
rejecting executory contracts recommences, thus giving an opportunity for
a newly appointed trustee to familiarize himselfwith the case. ,m
Does this mean the § 365(d) clock starts ticking allover again ifthe
case converts from one chapter to another? Not exactly or rather, not
always.
A. FROM CHAPTER 7 TO CHAPTER 13
A Chapter 13 plan may, "subject to section 365 ofthis title, provide
for assumption, rejection, or assignment of any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor not previously rejected under such
section. "78 This means a debtor cannot assume a contract or lease in her
converted Chapter 13 if the lease or contract was rejected under § 365 in
the Chapter 7 proceeding. For example, in Affordable Efficiencies, Inc.
v. Bane (In re Bane),79 the Chapter 7 trustee did not, within 60 days after
the order for relief, move either to assume the nonresidential lease or to
extend the time to decide. When the debtor later converted to Chapter 13,
the lessor sought relieffrom the stay. The debtor-lessee opposed, arguing
that upon conversion, a new 60-day period began to run.
The court disagreed. Section 365(d)(4) gives the trustee 60 days to
assume or reject or to extend the time to decide. If the trustee fails to act
during that time, whatever the reason, the lease is deemed rejected.
76. 11 U.S.C § 348(a) (1998).
77. Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, SEN. REP. No. 95-989.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX7) (1998).
79.228 B.R. 835, 840 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1998), aff'd mem., 182 F.3d 906 (4th Cir. 1999)
(table).
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Given the plain language of the statute, and absent a motion for
extension prior to expiration of the 60-day period, this Court does
not have the authority to extend the rejection period once the
period has run. In the case at bar, the 60-day period ran before the
conversion to [C]hapter 13. Therefore, the lease was deemed
rejected and conversion to [C]hapter 13 did not give either the
Debtor or the [C]hapter 13 trustee a new 60-day period to assume
or reject.80
As several courts have noted, "in virtually every Chapter 7 no-asset
case the trustee realizes no benefit from assuming the debtor's residential
lease, and thus in virtually every Chapter 7 no-asset case, the residential
lease is deemed rejected after the requisite 60-day period.81
Assume the debtor petitions for Chapter 7 relief. Sixty days comes
and goes with no action at all regarding any unexpired lease or executory
contract. At that point, the debtor informs you about her residential lease
and her desire to keep it. Is all lost? Maybe not.
In Westgate Village Apts. v. Sims (In re Sims),82 the debtor had filed
a Chapter 7 petition in 1996 in response to her landlord's action to
repossess the premises. Prior to and after her Chapter 7 petition, the
debtor "failed to make her rent payments of $2.00 a month. "83 The order
granting the lessor relief from the stay provided that the lease "was
80.Id. at 841; see also In re Sheard, 1999 WL454260 at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. June 24, 1999)
("[T]he debtor controls the chapter under which she files. Thus, if it is the debtor's intention to retain
the property, she will file under Chapter 13 (or convert to Chapter 13 prior to the sixty day deadline)
.which gives her the ability to assume her executory contract or lease."); U.S.A for Veterans Admin. v.
Benson (In re Benson), 76 B.R. 381 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987) (trustee's failure to act in Chapter 7 resulted
in deemed rejection ofresidential lease and once rejected, debtor could not assume it in her subsequent
Chapter 13 plan); 2 KEJlll M. LUNDIN, CHAP'ffiR 13 BANKRUPTCY § 8.27, at 8-51 (1993)("conversion
does not resurrect the rights that the debtor lost during the Chapter 7 case. For example, ifthe debtor's
right to assume an executory contract expired during the Chapter 7 case, conversion to Chapter 13 does
not renew the lost opportunity."); cf In re Weinstock, 1999 WL 260960 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. April 27,
1999) (No. 96-31 I47DWS) (debtor cannot re-reject executory contract in his superseding Chapter 13
case so as to transform nondebtor party's claim for postpetition payments to prepetition, unsecured
status).
81. Sheard at *3; Westgate Village Apts. v. Sims (In re Sims), 213 B.R. 641, 643 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1997); In re Touloumis, 170 B.R. 825, 828 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)(residentiallease, while
theoretically asset ofestate, is not one that Chapter 7 trustee will generally assume and assign: therefore,
lessor is entitled to stay reliefto continue eviction proceedings because such proceeding usually has no
discernible impact on bankruptcy case). The Sheard court found some consolation in knowing that a
debtor can control the situation and seek Chapter 13 reliefifhe or she wants to retain a contract or lease
(and is properly advised).
82.213 B.R. 641 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1997).
83.Id. at 642. "$2.00 a month" is not a typo. The lease was subsidized and based on income.
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deemed rejected insofar as this Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate is
concerned. ,,84 The debtor received her discharge on October 4, 1996. A
few months later, in April of 1997, a state court proceeding resulted in an
order in favor ofthe landlord. Eviction was scheduled for May 15, 1997.
The debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition on May 12, 1997.
The landlord maintained that it was entitled to relief from the stay
because the prior court order in the Chapter 7 case had terminated the
debtor's interest in the lease. According to the court, the landlord was
quite mistaken. Granting a lessor relieffrom the stay does not terminate
a debtor's interest in a lease nor does rejection, whether it occurs by
motion or operation of law. Rejection constitutes breach, entitling the
nondebtor party to damages. Turning to the Code, the court noted that a
debtor has until plan confirmationto assume or reject a lease ofresidential
real estate according to § 365(d)(2). Section 1322(b)(7) permits its
assumption in the plan unless it was previously rejected under § 365. The
lease had not been rejected in the Chapter 13 case because the court had
not confirmed a plan or authorized rejection outside of it. The only
remaining question was "whether under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7), Debtor
may assume the lease inasmuch as it was rejected in her prior Chapter
7."85
The court began its analysis ofthis question by looking at practice
under the Bankruptcy Act, concluding that it "would establish that, once
the lease was rejected in the Chapter VII, it could not be assumed later in
the same case. The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 did not change this. Thus,
we conclude that rejection is final for purposes of § 1322(b)(7) only with
respect to the particular case in which the contract was rejected. "86 But,
explained the court, here the Chapter 7 case was
prosecuted to conclusion, a discharge entered and the case was
closed. Because the lease was rejected by the estate in the
[C]hapter 7, it reverted to Debtor. When she later filed this
[C]hapter 13 case, her property and possessory interests in the lease
became property of this [C]hapter 13 estate. The rejection in the
[C]hapter 7 did not affect Debtor's ability to assume or reject the
lease under § 1322(b)(7) in the second case. The date of filing of
the [C]hapter 13 is the relevant date by which to measure what
84. [d. at 643.
85. [d. at 643.
86. [d. at 644.
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constitutes property of this estate. The lease remained viable on
the filing date, despite [the lessor's] assertion to the contrary and,
therefore is property of the estate. 87
The court concluded the debtor could assume the lease in her Chapter 13
case if she could cure her defaults. 88 The court was not troubled by its
conclusion, given that the relevant state law permitted lessees to cure their
defaults and remain in possession until the very moment of actual
eviction. 89
The Sims' debtor's Chapter 2090 protected her right to assume her
lease. The court's reasoning would also serve to "preserve" the right to
assume if the debtor were able to obtain dismissal ofthe Chapter 7 case
and refile under Chapter 13. Debtors who find themselves on the other
side of the 60-day period with a lease they forgot to mention should try
either a Chapter 20 or request dismissal of the Chapter 7 case and file a
Chapter 13 petition.
Judge Lundin observes:
The most common executory contract for a Chapter 13 debtor is an
apartment lease. Sometimes the debtor's apartment lease is a
major asset of the estate-especially when the debtor is living in
government-subsidized housing and has avery favorable lease. All
too often, debtors' counsel do not think of an apartment lease as a
necessary part of the Chapter 13 plan.91
Even more fundamentally, apartment leases are apparently not on
some debtor's counsel's radar screens at all. If the lease is important to
the debtor, valuable, e.g., it is a subsidized lease, the debtor will almost
surely lose it in a Chapter 7 case. A Chapter 7 debtor's only hope to
retain it is a reaffirmation agreement and that requires the lessor's
consent. The case law suggests lessors would rather eat ground glass.
The debtor should seek Chapter 13 relief. Assumption does not require
87.Id.
88. Jd. at 644 n.7.
89. Jd. at 643, n.6. Because the debtor had failed to timely recertifY her eligibility for the rent
subsidy, it was possible that she would have had to pay the market rate of rent for the period during
which she was not certified. Ifso, she conceded cure was not feasible. The court refused to speculate
on the future, presumably because "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" Id. at 645. .
90. A decision to file a Chapter 7, followed immediately thereafter by a Chapter 13.
91. LuNDIN, supra note 36, § 4-87, at 4-189.
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the nondebtor party's consent and in a Chapter 13, unlike a Chapter 7, the
debtor can assume.
B. FROM CHAPTER 13 TO CHAPTER 7
The situation going in reverse is not nearly as complicated. The 60-
day period starts anew as ofthe time the case is converted from a Chapter
13 to a Chapter 7 unless the debtor has rejected or assumed the contract
or lease in the Chapter 13 (or Chapter 11). Because assumption is
unlikely to occur before confirmation, and most cases convert because a
plan cannot be confirmed, the Chapter 7 trustee will have a 60-day period
to decide in most cases.92 As one court explained, ''the unexpired lease
must be assumed within 60 days of the order for relief . ... [W]hen a
case under one chapter is converted to a case under another chapter, the
conversion of the case constitutes an order for relief. '>93
VI. NONDEBTOR'S RIGHTS
A. DURING POSTPETITION, PRE-REJECTION, PRE-ASSUMPTION PERIOD
Every school child knows that rejection ofan unassumed executory
contract or unexpired lease relegates the nondebtor party to a prepetition
claim for damages.94 Usually, that prepetition claim is unsecured. What
is the nondebtor party's situation during the time that the debtor has to
decide whether to assume or reject?
It all depends on who the nondebtor party is. Lessors ofcommercial
(nonresidential) real estate are entitled to timely performance of all
postpetition obligations.95 No hearing is necessary to authorize payment
of their administrative expense claim.96 In addition, commercial lessors
hold a claim "measured by the rent set forth in the lease rather than the
92. The exception concerns commercial leases in which the debtor is the lessee. Section
365(d)(4) requires action within 60 days after the petition in any reliefchapter or the lease is deemed
rejected.
93. Carricov. Tompkins (In reTompkins), 95 B.R. 722, 723 (9thCir. BAP. 1989)(emphasis
added).
94. 11 u.s.c. §§ 365(g)(I), 502(g) (1998).
95. Id. § 365(d)(3).
96. In re Brewer, 233 B.R. 825, 829 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1999) (majority view is commercial
lessor is entitled to allowance of administrative claim for rent without § 503 demonstration ofbenefit
to estate); In re Brennick, 178 B.R. 305, 307 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).
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property's fair market value,97 or the value ofthe benefit conferred on the
estate by its use.
The one source ofdisagreement lies in whether § 365(d)(3)'s timely
performance requires immediate payment even if that would create a de
facto priority for the commercial lessor at the expense of other
administrative claimants.98 In 1994, Congress gave comparable rights and
protection to lessors ofpersonal property "other than personalproperty
leased to an individual for personal, family or householdpurposes.'>99
Where does that leave nondebtor lessors of consumer goods and
residential real estate? From their perspective, in the Dark Ages. A
hearing is necessary to establish they hold an administrative expense
claim. The amount of their administrative claim, if any, will reflect the
value of the benefit the estate derived from using their property. So, for
example, what value would a Chapter 7 estate derive from a debtor's
residential lease? Not much and that would translate into an admin-
istrative claim in favor of the lessor equal to "not much."
What about the nondebtor residential real property lessor in a
Chapter 13 case? One court explained:
There is an apparent scarcity of case law discussing
administrative expense priority for post-petition rent ofresidential
premises in a Chapter 13 case (other than where an unexpired lease
was first assumed and later rejected). This lack ofauthority is not
surprising. In a Chapter 13 case, the amount of unpaid post-
petition rent is typically so small that the parties either reach a
compromise or abandon the claim, thereby avoiding litigation over
the issue.
97. Brennick, 178 B.R. at 307.
98. See, e.g., In re Joseph C. Spiess Co., 145 B.R. 597 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1992) (declining to
order payment ifthat would create priority); In re Virginia Packaging Supply Co., Inc., 122 B.R. 491
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (same): In re Almac's, Inc., 167B.R. 4 (Bankr. D.R.1.1994)(paymentordered
subject to disgorgement to extent necessary to provide same dividend to other administrative claimants
of equal rank); In re Buyer's Club Mkts., Inc., 115 B.R. 700 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (same); In re
Flugel, 197 B.R. 92, 95 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (statute requiring debtor to perform all obligations of
unexpired, nonresidential lease while deciding to assume or reject is designed to insure payment ofrent
during decision period) (Chapter 13) (dictum); In re Brennick, 178 B.R. 305, 308 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1995) (statutory command to timely perform "must be obeyed even though to do so grants a priority
as a practical matter"); In re Telesphere Communications, Inc., 148 B.R. 525, 529-31 (Bankr. N.D.
III. 1992) (it would be strange ifcommercial lessors, the object ofCongressional concern, received less
favorable treatment than postpetition suppliers who routinely receive full payment).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 365(dXlO) (1998) (emphasis added).
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Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly prevent
allowance of a claim for post-petition rent of residential property
in a Chapter 13 case as an administrative expense, it is difficult to
envision a situation where such a rental eXpense would qualify as
an actual and necessary cost ofpreserving the bankruptcy estate as
required by Section 503(b)(l)(A).IOO
Presumably the court's reasoning would extend to personal property
leases as well and it would not recognize an administrative expense claim
for the lessor ofthe Chapter 13 debtor's refrigerator or sofa.
It is easy to understand why postpetition, postrejection rental
payments on a debtor's refrigerator would not qualifY for administrative
expense status in Chapter 7. The expense is not an actual or necessary
cost to preserve the bankruptcy estate. Indeed, postrejection, leased
property is no longer part ofthe estate and hence its retention and use (by
the debtor) can hardly be seen to benefit the estate and the debtor's
creditors.
But in Chapter 13, there is no sharp line between the debtor and the
bankruptcy estate. In many instances, what is good for the debtor is good
for the estate. The benefit to the debtor benefits the debtor's creditors as
well. For instance, the debtor's ability to use (lease) a car enables the
debtor to get to work. The debtor's ability to work provides a source of
income from which the debtor can pay all his or her creditors. Some
Chapter 13 postpetition expenses will increase the return to all creditors.
If so, shouldn't such expenses, ifreasonable, be entitled to administrative
expense status? We doubt the last word has been written on this issue.
Regardless, the limbo period is relatively short for lessors of
residential real property and consumer goods. In a Chapter 7, all
executory contracts and leases of whatever religious denomination are
deemed rejected 60 days after the petition unless the court, for cause,
extends the period to decide. 101 In a Chapter 13, the time to propose a
plan is relatively short. 102 Resolution (confirmation or not) typically
occurs within months, not years, thereby limiting (although not
eliminating) the nondebtor party's exposure to loss.
100. In re Scott, 209 B.R. 777, 783 (Banke. S.D. Ga. 1997).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 36S(dX1), (dX4).
102. FED. R. BANKR. P. 301S(b)(ifplan not filed with petition, it must be filed within 15 days
thereafter "andsuch time may not be further extended except for cause shown and on notice as the court
may direct.").
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B. WHEN ASSUMED AGREEMENT IS BREACHED
After much wailing and gnashing ofteeth, most courts now seem to
agree that a nondebtor's claim for damages resulting from breach
("rejection") of an assumed lease or executory contract is entitled to
administrative expense statuS. 103
The court in Case Credit Corp. v. Baldwin Rental Centers, Inc. (In
re Baldwin Rental Centers, Inc.)l04 provides a sensitive, thoughtful
discussion ofthe issue. The debtor in Baldwin entered into 14 equipment
lease agreements with the lessor. The debtor's business plan was to
sublease the equipment to its customers at a higher price so it could meet
its rental obligations and still make a profit. The debtor was unable to
generate sufficient income to stay current on its lease payments and it
petitioned for Chapter 11 reliefon August 20, 1997. On January 7, 1998,
the court entered a consent order allowing the Debtor in Possession (DIP)
to assume 5 of the 14 leases and to reject the others. A little over a year
later, the DIP rejected the assumed leases.
The lessor requested the court to give its damages claim-future rent
owed under the breached, assumed leases-administrative expense status.
The debtor opposed the request, arguing that the future rents did not
confer any benefit on the estate and, therefore, they could not qualify for
administrative expense priority.
The court saw no way out ofthe conclusion that sections 365(g)(l),
(g)(2) and 502(g) establish Congress' intent to treat damages arising from
breach of an assumed lease differently from damages arising from
rejection of an unassumed lease. Whereas § 365(g)( 1) deems breach of
an unassumed lease to occur immediately before the filing, § 365(g)(2)
deems breach of an assumed lease to occur at the time of rejection, i. e.,
103. See, e.g., Nostas Assocs. v. Costich (In re Klein Sleep Prods., inc.), 78 F.3d 18 (2d Cir.
1996); In re Monica Scott, Inc., 123 B.R. 990 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); In re Pearson, 90 B.R. 638,
645 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (section 365, in particular, § 365(g)(2), applies to Chapter 13 proceedings
and debtor's rejection ofpreviously assumed lease gives rise to administrative claim in lessor for full
amount ofdamages caused by breach); Samore v. Boswell (In re Multech Corp.), 47 B.R. 747, 750-51
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985) (filing ofpetition creates DIP, a newjuridical entity distinct from prepetition
debtor: DIP's assumption ofexecutory contract is an act ofadministration creating an estate obligation.
It presupposes a direct transaction with DIP and DIP's subsequent rejection causes legally cognizable
injuries entitled to administrative expense priority). But see In re Johnston, 164 B.R. 551, 555 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. 1994) (awarding administrative expense claim for loss of future rents would contradict §
503(b)'s intent by unjustly enriching lessor and possibly eliminating any distribution to unsecured
creditors).
104.228 B.R. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1998).
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postpetition. Section 502(g) treats claims based on rejection ofunassumed
leases as prepetition claims. It says nothing about claims based on
rejection ofan assumed lease. The court interpreted § 502(g)'s silence as
a manifestation ofCongress' intent to treat claims arising from rejection
ofassumed leases as administrative expenses.
In response to the debtor's assertion that claims for future rents do
not confer a benefit on the estate and giving them administrative expense
priority might undermine reorganization attempts, the court almost seemed
to sigh. It acknowledged that Congress probably "never contemplated the
hardship that such damages inflict."105 It went on to articulate the Second
Circuit's reasoning in Klein Sleep. Essentially, the Second Circuit found
the benefit to the estate in the act ofassumption itself. With assumption,
"[bloth the debtor and the court have determined that the entire lease,
complete with any burdens it may pose, benefits the estate. The DIP
cannot then seek to avoid those burdens when 'the deal tum[s] sour. ",106
Moreover, the promise of administrative expense status encourages
creditors to deal with debtors during their reorganization attempts. And
a successful reorganization maximizes ''the value of the estate for the
benefit of all creditors."107
The court, very reluctantly, joined ranks with the clear majority view
because the Code's plain language "require[s] all liabilities flowing from
the rejection of an assumed lease to be accorded administrative expense
priority."108
VII. WHAT CONSTITUTES PROMPT CURE
Debtors who want to retain favorable executory contracts and leases
have the opportunity to assume them in a Chapter 13. Assumption,
according to § 365(b)(1)(A), requires cure of prepetition monetary
defaults or adequate assurance ofprompt cure. Section I322(b)(5) says
a Chapter 13 plan can "provide for the curing of any default within a
reasonable time . ..." In the context ofmortgage arrearages, courts have
allowed debtors to cure over the life oftheir plans. Do debtors have the
life of their plan to cure prepetition arrearages owed under a personal
property lease or lease of residential real estate? Most courts, struggling
105. [d. at 511.
106. [d. at 512 (quoting Klein Sleep, 78 F.3d at 26).
107. [d. at 511.
108. [d. at 512.
406 COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 104
with the interplay between §§ 365(b)(l)(A) and 1322(b)(5), have.
concluded that "prompt cure" means something significantly shorter than
the three-to-five year life of the plan. 109
In In re Reed, 110 the debtors' plan proposed to cure the prepetition
arrearages on their car lease over an I8-month period. They argued this
was "reasonable under the circumstances," given the practice in the
Kentucky bankruptcy court of allowing up to 24 months to cure. III The
court rejected the argument, distinguishing between cure ofarrearages on
long-term debt and that required for a personal property lease. It
announced five considerations it would use in the future to evaluate the
reasonableness ofthe proposed cure period: 1) the nature ofthe property;
2) the terms of the lease; 3) the amount of arrearages; 4) the remaining
length of the lease term; and 5) how the debtors proposed to cure the
lease. For consumer car leases, it announced a rebuttable presumption of
a maximum six month cure period. 112
Courts apply similar restrictions when considering what constitutes
a "prompt" cure of arrearages under real estate leases. Thus, one court
held that, absent unusual circumstances, six months was the maximum
permissible cure period. 113
A proposal to cure within six months or less is perfectly reasonable
for car leases whose term can extend as long as four years and realty
leases whose duration is generally one year or longer. What about rent-to-
own (RTO) agreements under which the renter can choose every month
(or even every week) whether or not to renew. 114 As a matter oflogic, one
would think courts would impose a shorter time, perhaps requiring cure
within the first month ofthe plan. But an Alabama court, in In re Trusty,
concluded a 12-month cure period "is most certainly prompt" in
109. Ifthe default isposlpetition, the debtor must cure the default in one lump sum at the time
ofassumption. In re Hall, 202 B.R. 929 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1996).
110.226 B.R. I (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1998).
111. Id. at 2.
112.Id. Cf In re French, 131 B.R. 138,140 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 199 I)(plan provision to cure
default in 6 months presumptively prompt); Bajardi v. Daugherty (In re Daugherty), 102 B.R. 167
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989) (one year to cure arrearages under car lease too long); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Lawrence, 11 B.R. 44 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981)(same).
113. In re Morgan, 181 B.R. 579, 587-88 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994); cf In re DiCamillo, 206
B.R. 64, 72 (Bankr. D.N.I. 1997) (cure over 4-year period not prompt); In re Flugel, 197 B.R. 92, 97
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (cure over IO-year period not prompt!); In re Yasin, 179 B.R. 43 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. I995)(cure over 6 month period reasonable); In re Liggins, 145 B.R. 227, 231 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1992) (cure over 4-year period not prompt).
114. For a discussion ofRTOs, see infra Part VIII.
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connection with an RTO. llS To further confuse matters, only a year
before, the same judge had ruled that 6 months was the presumptive limit
for cure in a Chapter 13.116
.. In reaching this surprising conclusion, the Trusty court opined that
because '" [p]rompt' is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code ... a rourt is
not required to define it in terms of ... the length ofthe past or expected
relationship ofthe parties."117 The next paragraph ofthe opinion revealed
what was really driving the court's decision:
If [C]hapter 13 is to provide an effective means for debtors to
reorganize, it must provide for the temporary retention by the
debtors ofpersonal property to aid in that reorganization. Section
3~5 was created to fulfill that fundamental requirement. While
, some items subject to rent-to-own agreements may notbe necessary
for the ultimate reorganization of a debtor, the opportunity to
maintain the status quo, even on a temporary basis, may give a
financially troubled debtor the break needed to succeed with a
. [C]hapter 13 plan. While a debtor may not maintain a "renter's"
relationship with a merchant for the entire 12 month cure period,
the bankruptcy relationship that exists for this period is necessary
! j for a successful reorganization. 118
The imprecise nature ofthe term "prompt" permitted the court to strike a
blow in favor ofhelping debtors succeed in their Chapter 13 plans. The
court's expansive view of"prompt" gave debtors in RTO relationships the
opportunity to keep property in the short term without paying all·
prepetition arrearages owed.
Prudential Investments Co. v. Physique Forum Gym, Inc. (In re
Physique Forum Gym, Inc.)119 stakes out a lonely position, holding that
§ 365 must "be read in conjunction with" § l08(b).120 As a consequence,
115. 189 B.R. 977,984 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
116. In re Morgan, 181 B.R. 579,587-88 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994).
117. Trusty, 189 B.R. at 984 n.17.
118.Id.
119.27 B.R. 691 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982).
120. Section 108(b) provides:
(b) Except as provided in subsection(a) ofthis section, ifapplicable nonbankruptcy law,
an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within
which the debtor or an individual protected under section 1201 or 1301 ofthis title may
file any pleading, demand, notice, or proofofclaim or loss, cure a default, or perfonn
any other similar act, and such period has not expired before the date ofthe filing ofthe
(continued... )
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a debtor must cure defaults no later than 60 days after commencement of
the case or the period ofcure in the contract, whichever is longer. 121 Most
courts do not read § 108(b) in that manner:
To the extent that the provisions of § 108(b) overlap with § 365 in
the area of executory contracts, I find no conflict. Both sections
operate independently and serve different functions. Section
108(b) has the very limited function of extending statutory and
contractual term periods. Section 365, on the other hand,
determines the rights and obligations ofparties for assumption and
rejection ofexecutory contracts. The mere extension oftime under
§ I08(b) does not, in any way, alter either the trustee's or creditor's
rights under § 365 .... Most situations where § 108(b) extends
time periods involve mortgage foreclosure and contract for deed
cancellations. The detriment to the creditor resulting from the §
I08(b) cure period in contract for deed cancellations, for example,
is relatively minor ifthe trustee is unable to or elects not to cure the
default. 122
Indeed, like most courts, the above court understands § I08(b) to expand
rather than limit the trustee's rights under § 365.
Both Trusty andPhysique Forum are anomalies. Generally, the case
law establishes six months or less as a reasonable period of time to cure
prepetition arrearages under a car or real estate lease.
Often, cure regarding a residential lease will involve significant
amounts ofmoney. In In re Liggins, it was over $8,000. 123 The debtor's
plan proposed payment ofmost lease arrearages as well as full payment
of an unsecured educational loan. All other unsecured creditors would
receive a 1% payout. The Chapter 13 trustee objected to confirmation,
arguing that the plan unfairly discriminated. The court sustained the
objection. Although it was willing to recognize that a debtor could treat
120. (...continued)
petition, the trustee may only file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the later
of-
(1) the end ofsuch period, including any suspension ofsuch period occurring on or
after the commencement ofthe case; or
(2) 60 days after the order for relief
11 U.S.C. § 108(b)(1994).
121. Physique Forum, 27 B.R. at 693.
122. Econo-11Ierm Energy Sys. Corp. v. Prudentialinsur. Co. (In re Econo-11Ierm Energy Sys.
Corp.), 80 B.R. 137, 140-41 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
123. 145 B.R. 227 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
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her landlord's claim differently because a debtor needs a home for herself
and her family, the court wanted the debtor to make some evidentiary
showing "of the necessity . . . to pay the claim in full so that she may
continue to occupy this particular apartment. The critical question will
be whether there is such necessity that justifies a mere token payment of
other unsecured debt.,,124
VIII. RENT-TO-OWN CONTRACTS
-Almost unknown 30 years ago, rent-to-own transactions (RTOs),
sometimes called lease-purchase agreements, have become a major way
to obtain goods-household furniture, appliances and electronic goods-
for those unable to buy them because oftheir low income, poor credit or
both. By 1997, RTOs had become a $4.5 billion industry, with over
7,500 stores engaged primarily in RTO transactions serving 3.5 million
customers.125
Characterization of RTO agreements in bankruptcy is important.
Assume Consumer goes into a store and sees a large screen TV he likes.
Eager to watch the entire ACC basketball season at home rather than in
a sports bar, he makes an RTO agreement with Store and takes the TV
home. If Consumer, now Debtor, seeks bankruptcy relief, the court's
characterization of the RTO agreement will affect the terms upon which
he can retain the TV.
If the agreemerit is a ''true lease" or an executory contract, he can
keep it only ifhe cures all defaults (pays all arrearages) and assumes the
contract. Essentially, he is bound by the bargain he struck. He is not so
bound if his contract constitutes a security agreement. First, unless the
TV is worth more than $425, it is potentially exempt under the federal
exemption scheme.126 Even if Consumer's state has opted out, his state
exemption statute will probably recognize an exemption right in the TV.
If Store's security interest is avoidable, Debtor can keep the TV without
more. Even ifStore's security interest is valid, in a Chapter 7, Debtor can
keep the TV by paying Store its value. 127 In a Chapter 13, he can keep the
124.Id. at 231.
125. Susan Lorde Martin & Nancy White Huckins, ConsumerAdvocates v. The Rent-to-Own
Industry: Reaching a Reasonable Accommodation, 34 AM. Bus. L.J. 385, 385 & n.2 (1997).
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (1998).
127. See id. §§ 506(a) (allowed secured claim) & 722 (redemption).
410 COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 104
TV by paying the creditor the amount of its secured claim plus interest
over the life of the plan. 128
The true lease-security lease distinction is important outside of
bankruptcy as well. Lessors enjoy greater rights than secured creditors
in the event of lessee default. Lessors are not required to dispose of
repossessed leased goods. They do not have to give the lessee notice of
anything. They can sell leased goods and retain whatever profit they
make. They are also not subject to the Truth in Lending Act or state
usury statutes. 129
Although many variations exist, an RTO transaction goes something
like this. Consumer rents a television for $166.95 a month. According to
the agreement, at the end of each month, she has the option of either
renewing the agreement by paying another $166.95, or returning the
television to the store. If she faithfully pays for 18 months, she will
become the proud owner of a television, paying a total of $3005.10 for
something probably worth less than $1000. 130 The following is a typical
RTO contract:
RENTAL PURCHASE AGREEMENT
Date: 12/28/95 ....
RENTAL PURCHASE DISCLOSURES
1. RENTAL TERM: MONTHLY. ...
Rental payments are due at the beginning ofeach term that you choose to
rent the property. There are no refunds if you choose to return the
property before the end of the term.
2. DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY AND RENTAL RATES:
Category/Description Mo. Rent
LR Suite/Ashley 59.00
128. See § 1325(aX5)(b).
129. See Scott J. Burnham, The Regulation ofRent-ta-Own Transactions, 3 loY. CONSUMER
L. REp. 40, 40-41 (1991).
130. These figures, except for the guesstimate about the value ofthe television, are taken from
In re SteHman, 237 B.R. 759 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999). Two ofthe debtor's other debts illustrate her
place in the financial food chain: a 4-month loan for $200 with an interest rate of 132.96% year, and
a two week loan for $200 with an interest rate of 533% per year. Id. at 763 n.l O.
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3. INITIAL RENTAL PAYMENT:
Your initial rental payment will include the following charges:
c· Rent Delivery Charge Total
59.00 5.00 64.00
5. COST OF LEASE:
If you choose to rent to own you must renew this lease for the
following number of months or weeks:
15 Months $59/mo. for a total cost of$885.00
6. OUR ESTIMATED FAIR MARKET VALUE FOR TIllS
PROPERTY IS $395.00
7. COST OF LEASE SERVICES:
Ifyou renew this lease for the number ofterms necessary to acquire
ownership the cost of lease services will be $490.
8. EARLY PURCHASE OPTION:
If you wish to purchase the rental property you may do so at any
time by the payment of55% ofthe remaining Cost ofLease calculated at
that time.
TYPE OF TRANSACTION: TIllS IS A RENTAL TRANSACTION.
You may use the property for the term ofthis lease. At your option, you
may renew this lease. To do this, you must make a rental payment in
advance for each term you wish to rent the property. The rental rates are
shown above. Time is of the essence in this lease. There are no grace
periods.
TERMINATION: You may voluntarily terminate this lease at the end of
any term with no penalty. To do so, you must return the property and pay
all rental payments and other charges due through the date of return.
TITLE, MAINTENANCE AND TAXES: We retain title to the property
at all times and will pay any taxes which might be levied on the property.
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You do not own the property unless you buy it or acquire ownership as
provided by the tenns ofthis lease. We will maintain the property in good
working order as long as you rent it.
INTENT: You agree that by signing this lease your intent is to rent rather
than purchase the property.
BY SIGNING THIS LEASE, YOU ADMIT THAT YOU HAVE READ
IT, THAT YOU UNDERSTAND IT AND THAT YOU HAVE
RECEIVED A SIGNED COpy OF IT. YOU ALSO ADMIT THAT
YOU RECEIVED THE PROPERTY IN SATISFACTORY
CONDITION.
WITNESS: /s/ Conger
LESSOR: Mr C's
RENTER: Lilla Lipton
CO-RENTER: Johnnie B. Jarrell!3!
Much litigation, both in and outside of bankruptcy, has focused on
characterizing the true nature ofa RTO transaction. Three lines ofcases
have emerged. One strand, a majority ofcourts, relies on § 1-201(37) of
the U.C.c. to hold that RTO transactions are leases, not secured
transactions. Another, relying on state RTO statutes, holds that RTO
transactions are neither secured transactions nor leases. These courts
treat RTO transactions as a species of executory contract. As a
consequence, their conclusion offers little comfort to debtors because the
debtor still has to assume the contract to retain the goods. Finally, a few
courts, in and out ofbankruptcy, have characterized RTO transactions as
secured transactions.
In re Frady l32 is representative of the cases holding an RTO
transaction to be a true lease under U.C.C. § 1-201(37). In Frady, the
debtors entered into two RTO agreements with the creditor. The first was
for a VCR, the second for a washer. The agreement for the VCR called
for 70 weekly payments of $9.99, with the right at that time to buy the
VCR for a purchase price ofno more than $89.91. The agreement for the
washer called for 81 weekly payments of$18.99, with the right to buy the
131. Mr. C's Rent To Own v. Jarrells (In re Jarrells), 205 B.R. 994, 995 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
132. 141 B.R. 600 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1991).
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washer for a purchase price ofno more than $116.91. In both cases, the
debtors could terminate the agreement at the end of any weekly term and
have no obligations other than paying any back rent they might owe.
The debtors listed the creditor as a secured creditor and proposed a
five year plan under which they would pay $5.56 per month for the VCR
and $11.13 for the washer. Not surprisingly, the creditor objected to
confirmation, arguing the RTO agreements were leases subject to
assumption or rejection. The debtors countered that the agreements were
"disguised sales."
The court made short shrift of the debtors' contentions. It
announced aper se rule that an RTO agreement is a true lease. The court
began by noting that § 1-201(37) defines "security interest" as "an interest
in personal property or fixtures which secures paymentor performance of
an obligation." Because the debtors had the right to terminate the RTO
agreements at any time without further obligation, by definition, the
agreements could not create a security interest, and had to be true leases.
The debtors also argued that the North Carolina Retail Installment
Sales Act makes a terminable lease a sale if the lessee has an option to
buy for nominal consideration. The court was, if anything, even less
impressed with this argument. It noted that the statute defined "nominal
consideration" as no more than 10% ofthe cash price ofthe goods at the
time of the contract. In this case, the option purchase price for the VCR
was $89.91, and the cash price $467.53. Similarly, the option purchase
price for the washer was $116.91, and the cash price $709.25. Because
the purchase price in both cases was greater than 10% of the cash price,
the purchase price was not "nominal consideration," and neither
agreement was a sale under the Retail Installment Sales Act.
The court therefore not only ordered the debtors to assume or reject
the RTO agreements, but gave the creditor an administrative expense
claim for unpaid postpetition rental payments. 133
Similarly, in Powers v. Royce. Inc. (In re Powers),134 the debtor
entered into three RTO agreements for new and used household goods.
The agreements provided for an initial two-week rental period. The
debtor had no obligation to renew, but could choose to do so for additional
two-week periods. The debtor could buy the goods in one of four ways:
(1) immediately for cash; (2) anytime within 90 days for cash; (3) at a
133.Id. at 603.
134.983 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1993).
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sliding scale after the initial 90 days; or (4) forno additional consideration
at the end ofthe contracts (the opinion did not state the total length ofthe
contracts).
The debtor's Chapter 13 plan listed the creditor as secured, with a
secured claim of$I,OOO (the value ofthe goods), and an unsecured claim
of $2,041. The creditor objected to confinnation, arguing the RTO
agreements were leases which the debtor had to assume or reject. The
bankruptcy court agreed with the debtor's characterization of the
agreements as disguised installment sales. The district court, agreeing
with the creditor, reversed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court.
Like the court in Frady, the Seventh Circuit relied on § 1-201(37)
of the U.C.C. to conclude that the debtor's power to terminate the RTO
agreements at any time was enough to make the agreements true leases.
Like Frady, it saw no need for further analysis.
Other courts have been uncomfortable with a per se approach to
deciding whether an RTO agreement is a true lease rather than a security
agreement. In Mr. C's Rent To Own v. Jarrells (In re Jarrells),135 the
court found provisions common in both true leases and secured credit
sales. The court noted that, after she made the last payment, the customer
would own the property outright. In addition, both the store's name and
the title of the contract, "rental-purchase agreement," supported the
debtor's contention that the transaction was a disguised security interest.
On the other hand, at least as many factors suggested a ''true lease."
The debtor could return the property at the end of any rental period,
giving her the right to terminate almost at will. Moreover, the lessor was
responsible for maintaining the property, and paying any taxes due on it.
Finally, the agreement itself expressly provided that the transaction was
a lease rather than a purchase. Balancing these various factors, the court
concluded that the agreements were true leases.
Several states have passed statutes specifically governing RTOs. In
such situations, the RTO statute, not the U.C.c., governs. Such
enactments may represent a legislative response to case law characterizing
RTO agreements as disguised security agreements. For instance, in In re
Goin, 136 a bankruptcy court in Idaho, relying on V.C.C. § 1-201(37),held
an RTO transaction was a secured transaction because the lessees bore
135.205 B.R. 994 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
136.141 B.R. 730, 731 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992).
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the risk of loss, were responsible for paying the sales tax, were the
beneficiaries ofwarranty provisions, and became the owners ofthe goods
at the end of the agreement.
Seven years later, another Idaho bankruptcy court revisited the issue.
The RTO in In re Stellman137 was essentially identical to the one in Goin.
The court felt compelled to conclude that the Idaho legislature had
overturned Goin by passing the "Idaho Lease-Purchase Agreement
ACt.,,138 According to the statute, "lease-purchase agreement"
means an agreement by a lessor and a consumer for the use of
personal property by a consumer primarily for personal, family or
household purposes, for an initial period offour (4) months or less
that is automatically renewable with each payment after the initial
period, but does not obligate or require the consumer to continue
leasing or using the property beyond the initial period, and that
permits the consumer to become the owner of the property. 139
The statute also expressly provided that § 1-201(37) ofthe Idaho U.C.C.
did not apply to lease-purchase agreements140 Based on this statutory
command, the court concluded the debtor could not treat her RTO
agreement as a' secured transaction. Consequently, the court could not
confirm her proposed plan, but the debtor was free to amend it once she
decided whether to assume or reject the RTO agreement. The court was
uncomfortable with the one-sidedness ofRTO transactions, noting that the
debtor had effectively paid annual interest of 132.96% on her
obligation. 141 Nevertheless, it declined to "hold that such agreements are
per se unconscionable and unenforceable, or so unfair in genesis or
impact that they must be judicially modified. 142
Alabama law underwent a similar transformation. In In re
Shelby,143 an Alabama bankruptcy court held that RTO transactions were
disguised security agreements. The Alabama Legislature responded by
enacting a statute rejecting the holding of Shelby. Under the statute,
RTOs are neither true leases nor secured transactions. They are a kind of
137.237 B.R. 759 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999).
138. IDAHO CODE § 28-36-101 et seq. (1998).
139. [d. § 28-36-102(5).
140. [d. § 28-36-103(c).
141. Stellman, 237 B.R. at 763, n.l0.
142.Id. at 764.
143. 127 B.R. 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991).
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hybrid beast, partaking of characteristics of both. 144 Even so, they are
contracts and, as such, arguably subject to § 365. One court interpreting
the Alabama RTO statute so held, concluding that RTO transactions were
subject to assumption or rejection under § 365. 145 Like the Idaho court in
Stellman, the court was uncomfortable with the result. It noted that it
could not "say that the opinions different from the one this Court holds are
not correct."146 It also manifested its discomfort by allowing the debtors
12 months to cure any defaults if they chose to assume the contracts. 147
In states that have enacted legislation like that of Idaho and
Alabama, RTOs do not fit within the traditional security interestJIease
dichotomy. Still, they are contracts, and according to the case law, they
are executory contracts, subject to assumption or rejection under § 365. 148
The courts seem to have reached that conclusion by a process of
elimination rather than affirmative analysis: If an RTO is not a secured
transaction or a lease, what else could it be but a contract? But executory
contracts are a subset ofthe class ofcontracts. To say it is a contract is
not to say it is an executory contract for bankruptcy purposes.
Is an RTO an executory contract? Does it meet the Countryman
definition ofa contract with material performance remaining on both sides
at the time ofthe debtor's bankruptcy petition?149 One reason courts hold
a RTO transaction is not a secured transaction is the absence of any
obligation on the debtor's part to renew the agreement. If the debtor has
no continuing obligation to perform under an RTO, it is difficult to see
how the agreement can qualify as an executory contract at least under the
conventional definition.
IfRTOs are not secured transactions, leases or executory contracts,
what are they and what treatment should they receive? Each RTO
agreement seems to represent a series ofsuccessive option contracts. The
debtor has the right to keep the goods if he or she exercises the option to
144. In reTrusty,189 B.R. 977, 981 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) ("bankruptcy courts in Northern
District ofAlabama recognize Alabama's rent-to-own statute exists in response to this court's opinion
in In re Shelby, 127 B.R. 682 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991)").
145.Id. at 980.
146.Id. at 981, n.7.
147. The nonnal period for cure of arrearages in personal property leases is six months. See
discussion ofcure, supra Part VII.
148. See, e.g., Trusty, 189 B.R. at 980.
149. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439,
460 (1973) (executory contract is one "under which the obligations ofboth the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are so far unperfonned that the failure ofeither to complete the perfonnance would
constitute a material breach excusing the perfonnance ofthe other").
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renew and thereby chooses to incur an obligation to pay for them for the
~ext period of use. Some courts characterize option contracts as
executory contracts. 150 Others view them as rights which pass to the
estate and which the estate can exercise ifit is in the estate's best interests
to do SO.151 The latter approach to RTOs would preclude debtors from
retaining goods if they had missed prepetition payments. The failure to
pay for past use would extinguish any future option to renew. Treated as
executory contracts, they are assumable despite prior "defaults" so long
as the Chapter 13 debtor cures those defaults within a reasonable period
oftime. Dodging or ignoring the "executoriness" bullet allows debtors to
keep goods they otherwise would have to surrender. And that may assist
the overall effort to help debtors rehabilitate financially. As one court
observed, being able to "maintain the status quo, even on a temporary
basis, may give a financially troubled debtor the break needed to succeed
with a [C]hapter 13 plan. "152
A few courts have characterized RTO contracts as conditional sales
contracts, giving rise to a security interest. 153 Although RTO statutes
have overruled many ofthese cases, some remain good law. In general,
these opinions are result-oriented in the extreme, with the courts
intervening to protect consumers from over-reaching merchants (and
themselves).
A good example is In re Barnhill,154 involving a fairly standard
RTO regarding a "home entertainment center." The original agreement
provided for an initial term ofone week, with the right to renew it for an
additional 103 weeks. The debtor could terminate without penalty at any
time by returning the system to the store. If the debtor made all 104
payments, she would own the center. She could also buy the center at any
time by paying 55% of the remaining scheduled payments. She later
entered into a similar agreement for a stereo set.
When the debtor petitioned for Chapter 13 relief, she listed the
merchant as a secured creditor. The merchant objected to confirmation,
arguing that the agreement was a true lease "regardless of the other
aspects of the agreement" because a South Carolina statute governed
150. See. e.g., In re AJ. Lane & Co., 107 B.R. 435 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Horton v. Rehbein
(In re Rehbein), 60 B.R. 436 (9th Cir. RAP. 1986).
151. See. e.g., Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Southrnark Corp. (In re RobertL. Helms Constr.
& Dev. Co.), 139 F.3d 702 (9th Cir. 1998) (en bane).
152. In re Trusty, 189 B.R. 977, 984 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).
153. UCC § 2-401(1).
154. 189 B.R. 611 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1992).
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"consumer rental-purchase agreements." The court rejected the argument,
concluding that § 1-201(37) governed the transaction because the rental-
purchase statute did not expressly pre-empt the V.C.C.
In concluding the RTO agreement was a disguised security
agreement, the court dismissed as inconsequential the debtor's right to
terminate the agreement without penalty. It focused instead on: 1) the
debtor's ability to buy the goods for no additional consideration; 2) the
debtor's assumption of the risk of loss; and 3) the fact that the total
payments significantly exceeded the value of the goods.
A few courts examining RTO agreements outside of bankruptcy
have also held them to be disguised security agreements. In Green v.
Continental Rentals,155 the court concluded that RTO agreements were
security agreements, as a matter of law, within the meaning of New
Jersey's non-amended version of § 1-201(37). The court similarly
concluded, as a matter of law, that the seller had violated the Truth in
Lending Act as well as New Jersey's Retail Installment Sales Act and its
Consumer Fraud Act.
Although litigation about the proper characterization of RTO
agreements continues, the trend is clear. They are either leases. or
executory contracts, and hence subject to § 365, in the eyes of most
courts. Only in those states that still have the pre-Article 2A version of
§ 1-201(37) or that lack a RTO statute, will a Chapter 13 debtor have a
fighting chance to keep her goods by paying the RTO merchant their value
plus interest over the life of a plan.
IX. ASSUMPTION OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
LEASES
In an era of plain meaning,156 codifying the obvious can produce
curious consequences. In 1984, at the prodding of the real estate lobby,
Congress amended § 365 to preclude trustees from assuming leases of
nonresidential real property that had "been terminated under applicable
nonbankruptcy law prior to the order for relief. . . ."157 At the same time,
it amended § 541(b) to exclude from property ofthe estate any interest of
a debtor-lessee under a nonresidential lease that had terminated
155.678 A2d 759, 765 (N.I Super. Ct. Law Div. 1994).
156. United States v. Ron PairE~.• lnc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 365(cX3) (1998).
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prepetition. 158 These amendments, along with others, were designed to
protect commercial lessors. 159 These particular amendments were intended
to stop courts from resurrecting dead leases, a miracle some courts had
been accomplishing before breakfast. The amendments were successful
in achieving their goal, but their goal was limited-to prevent courts from
reviving nonresidential leases that had terminated prepetition. Section
365(c)(3) literally invites courts to perform mouth-to-mouth resuscitation
on terminated residential leases. It is not surprising that some have
accepted the invitation.
In re Morgan l60 is representative of the "toehold" theory of
assumability. The debtor was the lessee of an apartment and behind on
her,rent. In her Chapter 13 plan, she proposed to assume the lease and
pay the back rent. The lessor requested relief from the stay to bring an
unlawful detainer action against the debtor at state law.
The court described (in painful detail) the Alabama procedures for
terminating a lease and dispossessing the tenant. If a tenant refuses to
leave following lease termination, the lessor must bring an unlawful
detainer action, but cannot do so until 10 days after giving the tenant a
notice to quit. The unlawful detainer complaint must be served on the
tenant at least six days before trial. There are appeal periods if the court
finds in favor ofthe lessor.
On June 30, 1994, after the tenant had missed her June rent, the
lessor gave the tenant written notice oftermination. On July 5, the lessor
asked the tenant to surrender the premises within 10 days. (She did not
pay the July rent.) The debtor petitioned for Chapter 13 reliefon July 22.
(She did not pay her August or September rent either.)
The lessor maintained the debtor could not assume the lease because
it had been terminated prepetition at state law pursuant to its terms. The
court explained that the lessor's position was exactly right-for leases of
nonresidential real property-but the lease in question was for residential
real property. "The only qualification on the right ofa Chapter 13 debtor
to assume a residential real property lease, other than prompt cure and
158.Id. § 541(b)(2).
159. S. REp. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1983); In re Bernard, 69 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D.
Haw. 1986) (Congress amended § 365 in response to "heavy lobbying by . . . lessors . . . often
frustrated by the long delay in regaining possession oftheir property.").
160. 181 B.R. 579 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994).
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adequate assurance of future performance . . . is that the lease be
'unexpired. ",161
The lessor maintained the lease was expired because "a lease expires
once it has been terminated under state law.,,162 The court thought
otherwise. If "expired" meant "terminated," § 365(c)(3) would be
superfluous. A debtor can't assume an expired lease. The right to
assume is limited to unexpired leases. Section 365 is captioned
"Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases." If "expired" and
''terminated'' are synonymous, then Congress did not need to enact
§§ 365(c)(3) or 541(b)(2) because "by definition, a lease 'terminated
under applicable nonbankruptcy law' could not be an 'unexpired
lease. "'163
According to the court, the terms have different meanings. '" Expire'
means 'to come to an end,' while the word 'terminate' means 'to bring to
an end. ",164 "Expire" is an intransitive verb. "Terminate" is transitive.
"Expire" in a contract or lease context means ''termination by mere lapse
oftime, as the expiration date ofa lease, insurance policy, statute, and the
like. "165 The word ''termination,'' on the other hand, in the same context,
means,
an ending, usually before the end of the lease or contract, which
tennination may be by mutual agreement or may be by exercise of
one party of one of his remedies due to the default of the other
party .... [T]he word "expired" denotes the natural or inevitable
end to a contract or lease by lapse of time, while the word
"tenninated" denotes the unnatural or premature end to a contract
or lease as the result of breach or forfeiture. To hold that the two
words are interchangeable would be to embellish the plain
meanings of both words, in' direct violation of the mandate of the
Supreme Court . . . and to frustrate the purpose behind section
1322(b)(7) ....166
161. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).
162.ld.
163.ld.
164. !d.
165. BLACK'S LAw DIC1l0NARY 579 (6th ed. 1990).
166.ld. at 584.
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But, claimed the lessor, there was nothing left for the debtor to
assume because ''the lease was extinguished upon termination."167 ''Not
so," replied the court, correcting the lessor's misperceptions regarding
termination. Termination does not effect "some mystical disappearance'
ofthe lease which cannot be undone. "168 Until the state court enters a writ
ofrestitution and no appeal is taken, reinstatement ofthe lease is not only
possible but contemplated by the law. In fact, the court pointed out, the
terms of the lessor's own lease established that the lease had life after
termination. The lease provided:
If the lease is tenninated by the Lessor for non-payment of
rent, and the Lessee pays the rent and other charges and thus
makes himself current, and remains or continues to be in
possession of the leased premises or any part thereof, with the
Lessor's consent, this lease will be considered reinstated, andwill
have effect as though it had not been terminated. 169
So, a lease that has terminated has not necessarily expired.
Moreover, termination ofa lease does not extinguish it. Consequently, a
terminated lease remains assumable.
Did the court recognize any point in time beyond which a debtor
could not assume a residential lease? The court noted two limitations:
1) the right does not extend beyond the lease term; and 2) it "presupposes
some possessory nexus or toehold in the property. Once that possessory
toehold is lost, no 'interest' exists to form the basis of an assumption
under § 365."170 A tenant loses its toehold when the writ of restitution is
executed.
The court believed public policy was on its side. If consumer
bankruptcy is to achieve its desired goal ofgiving debtors a fresh financial
start, it must give them the ability to temporarily retain their dwellings.
Congress enacted §§ 365 and 1322(b)(7) for that purpose. If the court
were to adopt the lessor's position, those provisions would be oflittle use
to most consumer debtors and that would substantially frustrate Chapter
13 's ultimate aim. Moreover, an expansive reading ofthe right to assume
residential leases provides "flexibility for those who rent to preserve their
167.Id.
168.Id. at 585.
169.Id. at 585 (emphasis added).
170.Id.
422 COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 104
residences, the same as homeowners. Surely, Congress did not intend to
protect homeowners while ignoring the plight of home renters."!7! In
addition, according to the court, between the requirement for prompt cure
and adequate assurances offuture performance, the Code provides lessors
with ample protection.
But, recognizing a right to assume does not insure a debtor's ability
to exercise it or the right to live happily ever-after. Actual assumption of
an unexpired residential real estate lease
is an onerous proposition, which, at best, affords, the debtor only
temporary housing. Be that as it may, sections 1322(b)(7) and 365
serve a Congressionally mandated purpose by providing assistance
to many financially troubled debtors. To effectuate that purpose,
however, the bankruptcy court must heed the plain language ofthe
statutes so as to include within their operation those persons whose
leases have been terminated under nonbankruptcy law. To
construe the statutes in a manner that would exclude from their
operation unexpired leases which have been terminated under
nonbankruptcy law would be counter to the design ofChapter 13. 172
The Seventh Circuit takes a different position. Essentially, a lease
is not assumable if the tenant's rights ended prepetition, whether that
171. Id. at 587.
172.Id. at 588. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Stoltz v. Brattleboro
Housing Auth. (In re Stoltz), 233 B.R. 280, 284 (D. Vt. 1998) (bankruptcy court erred, as a matter of
law, in denying tenant's motion to assume residential lease that had been terminated prepetition: under
Vermont law, a debtor's lease, although terminated, is not expired for purposes of Chapter 13 until
execution ofwrit ofpossession); Rossv. Metropolitan Dade County (In re Ross), 142 B.R. 1013, 1014-
15 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (until writ executed, debtor can assume unexpired lease ofresidential real estate),
aff'd mem., 987 F.2d 774 (11th Cir. 1993)(table);In re Atkins, 237 B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1999) (Florida recognizes anti-forfeiture doctrine which permits tenant to avoid lease forfeiture by
payingarrears with accrued interest: just as Chapter 13 debtor can cure default on mortgage ofprincipal
residence even when debt is accelerated and judgment of foreclosure entered but no foreclosure has
taken place, Chapter 13 debtor-tenant can cure lease default after judgment ofpossession but prior to
entry ofwrit ofexecution regardless oflease provisions); In re Mirns, 195 B.R. 472, 474-75 (Bankr.
W.O. Okla. 1996) (cases cited by debtor and lessor are not contradictory because each looks to
governing authority to determine iflease was terminated prepetition: although no Oklahoma cases have
considered when a residential lease expires, court holds that service of writ of assistance on debtor
extinguishes debtor's rights for purposes of§ 365 and because writ had not been served before debtor's
bankruptcy, § 365 and 1322(bX7) rernainavailableto debtor);In re Talley, 69 B.R. 219, 223 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1986) (ifevery default rendered lease "expired," provisions of § 365 pennitting cure of
defaultswouldbe surplusage); see also In re Yasin, 179 B.R. 43, 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejection
constitutes breach oflease: it does not terminate it).
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ending occurred as a result of expiration of the lease term or lease
termination as a result of default. 173
Robinson v. Chicago Housing Authority,174 is the leading opinion.
In Robinson, the debtor had trouble making her $22.00 monthly rent
payments during 1992. On January 7, 1993, the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA) served her with a Notice ofTermination ofTenancy. At
the time, she owed $66.00. The notice stated that her failure to pay $88
within 14 days would result in lease termination on the 15th day. When
she did not meet that deadline, CHA.filed a Forcible Entry and Detainer
Action and obtained a judgment ofpossession. The court order noted that
CHA could accept her rent if it chose to do so, but absent such
acceptance, a writ ofpossession would issue 30 days later. CHA refused
to accept the debtor's tender of all rent due and owing. On the day the
writ ofpossession was to issue, the debtor petitioned for bankruptcy relief
and proposed to assume the lease in her Chapter 13 plan.
The court rejected the debtor's argument that bankruptcy
distinguishes between "terminated" and "expired," and hence, she could
assume the terminated lease because it was unexpired. According to the
court, neither the debtor nor the legislative history provides any authority
to support the argument that Congress intended to give residential debtor-
lessees greater rights under federal law than they enjoyed at state law.
The 1984 amendments were intended to protect shopping center lessors
from the long delays, uncertainty and hiatus in payments caused by a
lessee's bankruptcy. Section 365(c) had "nothing to do with residential
leases.,,175 In addition,
Congress stated that "a distinction between residential and
nonresidential leases is made here and in other provisions in this
subtitle . . . to avoid depriving residential tenants of whatever
consumer protections they may have under applicable
non-bankruptcy law." ... Therefore, rather than supporting [the
debtor's] claim that Congress was suggesting enhanced federal
protections for residential lessees, the legislative history here
supports the established practice of looking to state law to
determine whether a lease is unexpired. 176
173. In re Finkley, 203 B.R. 95, 99 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1996).
174. 54 F.3d 3'16 (7th Cir. 1995).
175.Id. at 319.
176.Id.
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The court also rejected the debtor's argument on policy grounds,
reasoning that recognizing a debtor's continuing interest in a terminated
lease because it had not expired would subject landlords to continuing
uncertainty. The court concluded:
federal bankruptcy law draws no meaningful distinction between
"expired" and "terminated" residential leases and does not provide
greater federal protection for lessees under residential leases, the
stated terms of which have not run, even though they have been
otherwise terminated. Instead the federal law allowing
"unexpired" leases to be assumed calls for a determination whether
a lease has ended under state law. 177
By equating termination with expiration, a lease that has been
terminated at state law has also expired at state law according to the
Seventh Circuit's view. It is therefore dead at state law and unassumable
in bankruptcy. In the Seventh Circuit, then, a "possessory toehold" as of
the commencement of the case is not enough. When it's over, it's over,
and it's over when the lease has ended prepetition.
Needless to say, ifa lease has expired prepetition, the debtor cannot
assume it. So, too, if it will expire shortly after the filing, the debtor gains
little from assumption. In In re Watts,178 the lessor and lessee each had
the right to terminate the year-to-year tenancy by giving at least 60 days
written notice oftermination. Prepetition, the lessor gave timely notice of
its intention to terminate the lease.
In the debtor's subsequent bankruptcy, the debtor sought to assume
the lease. The lessor requested relieffrom the stay. Absent lease renewal,
177.Id. at 320. See also In re Williams, 144 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1998) (bankruptcy court
did not err in modifYing stay to allow state court proceeding to continue to detennine iflease had ended:
ifit had, debtor could not assume it because an ended lease has no assignable value); In re Bennett, 165
F.3d 31 (7th Cir. I998)(table)(companion case to Williams); In re Finkley, 203 B.R. 95 (Bankr. N.D.
lIl. 1996) (abstaining from determining whether debtor's tenancy terminated prepetition in favor of
allowing pending state court action to proceed); cf In re Stoltz, 220 B.R. 552 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998)
(although lease was not tenninated prepetition, it expired prepetition when landlord justifiably refused
to renew it in light of tenant's material breach in failing to pay rent), rev'd, Stoltz v. Brattleboro
Housing Auth. (In re Stoltz), 233 B.R. 280, 284 (D. Vt. 1998) (bankruptcy court erred, as a matter of
law, in denying tenant's motion to assume residential lease that had been tenninated prepetition: under
Vennont law, a debtor's lease, although terminated, is not expired for purposes of Chapter 13 until
execution ofwrit ofpossession); Estep v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Estep), 173 B.R. 126 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1994) (car lease terminated prepetition when debtor failed to cure within allotted time and
therefore, Bank's postpetition sale ofcar did violate stay).
178.181 B.R. 109 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994).
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the lease tenn had two weeks remaining. The court construed the lessor's
notice as notice of its intent not to renew the lease. It observed that it
knew "ofno legal basis upon which [the lessor] can be required to renew
the Debtor's lease once the lease tenn has expired ...."179 Given that
only two weeks remained in the existing lease tenn, assumption would
produce no real benefit to the debtor. The court granted the lessor relief
from the stay.
X. CONCLUSION
Unless Congress does away with bankruptcy relief by enacting
something that resembles H.R. 833, we can expect the next few years to
bring a maturer understanding ofChapter 13 as courts and attorneys give
ita hard look. Not least on the list ofthings in need ofenlightenment is
the, interplay between § 365 and Chapter 13. We welcome what we hope
is to come. In the meantime, attorneys need to remember that § 365 does
exist in the consumer context and the list of issues to consider should
include it.
179. Id. at 11 O.
